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LANEY, GARY KEITH, Ed.D. Legality of Restrictions on 
Athletic Eligibility of Secondary School Students. (1988) 
Directed by Dr. H.C. Hudgins, Jr. 137 pp. 
This study dealt with the problem of determining the 
legality of athletic eligibility restrictions at the 
secondary level. For the purposes of this study the problem 
was divided into five specific topic areas: gender-based 
discrimination, discrimination against the handicapped, 
transfer regulations, age limitations for participation, and 
academic eligibility. 
This research includes a review of the rules and 
regulations of the fifty state athletic associations and the 
District of Columbia. Court cases, which challenge the 
legality of these rules, make up the legal findings of this 
research. 
Female athletes cannot be discriminated against on the 
basis of their gender. Any sports program offered to males 
must be open to females or a separate and equal program must 
be provided for the female athlete. Males can be excluded 
from participation on female teams. 
Any handicapped student, who can meet team requirements 
in spite of his handicap, must be allowed the right to 
participate in secondary school athletics. The school has 
an obligation to inform parents of the possible risk of 
injury but should not deny eligibility to a student against 
the wishes of the parents. 
Transfer rules have been upheld by the courts when they 
have been viewed as having accomplished the purpose for 
which they were written, and when they were administered in 
a way that was neither arbitrary nor capricious. 
All state athletic associations have set age 
limitations for participation in secondary athletics. The 
courts have upheld these regulations because of the danger 
of allowing mature adults to participate against less mature 
students. 
Courts have upheld the right of states to set and 
enforce academic standards as a requirement for athletic 
eligibility. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The writer wishes to express his sincere appreciation 
to the members of his dissertation committee. Dr. H. C. 
Hudgins, Jr., chairman, provided direction, encouragement, 
patience, and true professionalism during the preparation of 
this dissertation. Dr. Edwin Bell, Dr. James Runkel, and 
Dr. Harold Snyder served as committee members and provided 
advice, direction, and encouragement during the dissertation 
process. 
The writer also wishes to express his thanks to Mrs. 
Veo Gibbs, who spent many hours serving as a reader for this 
dissertation. 
The writer also wishes to express his gratitude to his 
wife, Debra, and two sons, Bryan and Barry, who sacrificed 
many family hours that were used in the preparation of this 
dissertation. Also, the writer owes a debt of gratitude to 
his parents for providing help that allowed him time to work 
on this dissertation. Without their help and support this 
project would not have been possible. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
APPROVAL PAGE ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS i i i 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION. . 1 
Background of the Study 3 
Problem Statement 6 
Purpose and Significance 7 
Definitions 8 
Methodology 10 
Delimitations 13 
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 15 
Introduction 15 
Historical Perspective 16 
Gender-Based Discrimination 22 
Discrimination Against the Handicapped 30 
Transfer Regulations 37 
Age Limitations 43 
Academic Eligibility 47 
III. REVIEW OF CASES 57 
Introduction 57 
Gender-Based Discrimination 58 
Discrimination Against the Handicapped 75 
Transfer Regulations 84 
Age Limitations 93 
Academic Eligibility 98 
IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 104 
Introduction 104 
Summary of Findings 105 
Gender-Based Discrimination 105 
Discrimination Against the Handicapped...107 
Transfer Regulations 108 
Age Limitations 110 
Academic Eligibility 110 
Conclusions Ill 
iv 
Implications for Practice 114 
Recommendations for Further Study 116 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 117 
APPENDIX A. GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATION 
STATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION POSITIONS 130 
APPENDIX B. AGE LIMIT REQUIREMENTS BY STATE 132 
APPENDIX C. STATES WIHT AN EIGHT SEMESTER RULE 133 
APPENDIX D. ACADEMIC REQUIREMENTS FOR 
ATHLETIC PARTICIPATION 134 
APPENDIX E. STATE TRANSFER RULES 136 
V 
1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Dreams of being the sports hero in high school, 
college, and even in the professional leagues occupy a large 
part of many young children's early fantasies. For many of 
these dreamers the dream is shattered early in life when 
they realize that they simply are not good enough to perform 
at the level necessary to attain stardom. But what of those 
few who are good enough to be the hero? What happens when 
something outside their control, something referred to as an 
eligibility rule, forces them to the sideline? These young 
persons may lose an opportunity to earn a scholarship to 
college, and from there an opportunity to play in the 
professional leagues and make large sums of money. Is there 
any recourse, can there be legal action, is there such a 
thing as the "right to participate"? As dreams are 
shattered and students are denied the right to participate, 
they are, in increasing numbers, turning to the courts for 
rulings on the legality of the eligibility requirements 
which govern their participation. 
A review of court cases since 1972 dealing with student 
eligibility for interscholastic athletics revealed a 
breakdown into five major subject matter categories: 
gender-based discrimination, discrimination against the 
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handicapped, transfer regulations, age limitations, and most 
recently academic eligibility. In most situations these 
suits, initiated by parents on behalf of their children are 
brought against local schools, local school boards, and 
state athletic associations. 
State and national high school athletic organizations 
are necessary to protect the activity and athletic 
interests of the high schools, to promote an ever 
increasing growth of a type of interscholastic 
athletics which is educational in both objective and 
method and which can be justified as an integral part 
of the high school curriculum, and to protect high 
school students from exploitation for purposes having 
no educational implications. (1) 
These athletic associations exist for the purpose of 
establishing rules and regulations and for the purpose of 
enforcing these rules. When eligibility rules are 
challenged, the courts have upheld the rights of the 
athletic associations to make and enforce rules as long as 
the rules were established for a specific educational 
purpose, and when the rule does what it was designed to do 
and nothing else. 
Courts have consistently held that participation in any 
activity, including sports, is not a property right under 
the fourteenth amendment and is therefore not protected by 
the Constitution. (2) 
1 North Carolina High School Athletic Association 
Handbook, Rick Strunk, ed. (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The North 
Carolina High School Athletic Association, Inc., 1987), 11. 
2 The leading court case that established the concept 
that the student's right to participate did not fall within 
the protection of the due process clause of the Constitution 
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BACKGROUND OP THE STUDY 
No one seems to know when athletic competition began 
nor does anyone know what the sport was that fostered such 
competition. However, it is possible to reconstruct how 
such competition began in the area of secondary 
interscholastic athletics. "Interscholastic athletics 
started on a local scale with nearby schools participating 
with each other. As the popularity of these contests grew, 
and as transportation facilities improved, sectional and 
state-wide contests were held." (3) The birth and growth of 
interscholastic athletics was not smooth and problem free. 
The early years were filled with problems for schools that 
tried to field athletic teams. "Years ago when high school 
athletics began, competition was informal and unguided. 
Abuses were prevalent as adults played with students, rules 
were vague or non-existent, and an absence of discipline 
endangered the program." (4) Without any form of 
regulation, there began to appear large discrepancies in the 
is Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association, 
430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1970). Subsequent court cases have 
cited this case when dealing with due process claims on this 
subject. 
3 George E. Shepard and Richard E. Jamerson, 
Interscholastic Athletics, (New York, Toronto, London: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1953), 20. 
4 Letter received from Charlie Adams, Director, North 
Carolina High School Athletic Association, March 31, 1986. 
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eligibility regulations of the different schools. (5) "Far 
sighted school administrators observed the need for an 
organization larger than the local unit to preserve the 
educational benefits of interscholastic athletic 
competition; an organization to control, supervise, and 
direct these activities; and an organization directed by the 
school administrators themselves." (6) The first state 
athletic associations were formed in an attempt to create an 
organization that would be able to control the eligibility 
requirements of the entire state. The first states to form 
such organizations were Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin 
which formed athletic associations between 1895 and 1900. 
(7) In the years following the early 1900's, all states and 
the District of Columbia followed the lead of these three 
states and formed state or district athletic associations. 
The formation and growth of these athletic associations led 
to legal battles to determine their right to make and 
enforce rules of eligibility. A review of the history of 
eligibility as determined by the courts shows that in the 
earlier cases, prior to 1972, the topics being considered 
were; secret societies, married students, and civil rights. 
Since the early years courts have upheld the right of the 
5 Shepard and Jamerson, 20. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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athletic associations to supervise the interscholastic 
activities of member schools and to rule athletes ineligible 
for athletic competition when they violate the rules of the 
association. (8) 
As athletic associations began to increase in number, 
several of the state associations began to see a need for an 
organization that could regulate the state associations and 
give some stability in regulations from state to state. In 
1920, representatives from five state associations met in 
Chicago to discuss the formation of such an organization. 
(9) "In 1921, four states, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, and 
Wisconsin became charter members of this organization." (10) 
In 1922 this organization became known as the National 
Federation of State High School Associations. (11) In 1969 
Texas joined the National Federation which gave it its 
current fifty-one United States members, made up of the 
fifty state associations and the District of Columbia. This 
addition made it a total national organization. (12) 
In its brief history, interscholastic athletics has 
8 Legal Issues in Education, ed. E.C. Bolmeier 
(Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company, 1968), 
255 - 256. 
9 Shepard and Jamerson, 65. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Handbook, 1981 -1982, National Federation Of State 
High School Associations,(Kansas City, Missouri: National 
Federation of State High School Associations,1981), 7. 
12 Ibid, 110. 
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evolved from no organization to the complex structure that 
now exists. In all of its dealings, the purpose is to 
maintain a universal and fair set of rules and regulations 
and to preserve the educational component of secondary 
school athletics. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This study dealt with the problem of determining the 
legality of athletic eligibility restrictions at the 
secondary school level. The broad problem was broken down 
into five more specific topics: gender-based 
discrimination, discrimination against the handicapped, 
transfer regulations, age limitations for participation, and 
academic eligibility. This study also examined three 
federal statutes, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, (13) Title 
IX, (14) and Public Law 94-142, (15) and the effect each 
has had on the eligibility requirements placed on students 
by state boards of education, state legislatures,state 
athletic associations, and local boards of education. This 
study also looked at court cases that have been decided 
13 Statutes at Large, "The Rehabilitation Act of 1973", 
Public Law 92-318, Sec. 504, March 23, 1972. 
14 Statutes at Large, "Education Amendment of 1972", 
Public Law 92-318, Title IX, Sec. 901, June 23, 1972. 
15 Statutes at Large, "Education for all Handicapped 
Children Act of 1975", Public Law 94-142, Nov. 29, 1975. 
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since 1972 in each of these areas. It was anticipated that 
this study would provide secondary school administrators 
with a guide to use when dealing with difficult eligibility 
questions by providing specific athletic eligibility 
regulations and the position of the courts concerning each 
of these issues. 
PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
This study was designed to determine the legality of 
eligibility restrictions governing student participation in 
secondary school interscholastic athletics. For the 
secondary school administrator, the problem of ruling on 
student eligibility in an improper way may result with a 
court action against the school and the local school board. 
The purpose of this study was to provide administrators 
with answers to the questions they might have in dealing 
with athletic eligibility. As a result administrators would 
be able to make better decisions when in possession of 
detailed and valid information. 
The successful resolution of this problem would, if 
thoroughly resolved, result in the elimination of athletic 
eligibility cases being brought before the courts. However, 
it is not likely that a total resolution of the problem will 
ever occur. A more realistic result would be that those 
administrators who use the information presented in this 
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study will be able to avoid many court cases based on 
athletic eligibility. 
Athletic eligibility is an area of major importance in 
secondary schools today. If an athlete is talented enough 
and willing to work at perfecting his skills, he may be able 
to pay for his college costs by playing sports. An even 
smaller percentage of these athletes will be able to advance 
to the professional leagues and earn large sums of money as 
professional athletes. When dealing with the future of an 
athlete it is extremely important that all of the facts are 
collected and that the administrator responsible for making 
the decision is well informed concerning the legal 
ramifications of his decision. A wrong or unwise decision 
might deprive a student of a bright future and an 
opportunity to earn considerable money. 
DEFINITIONS 
For the purpose of this study, the following 
definitions should be of value to the reader: 
Discrimination = "In constitutional law, the effect of 
a statute or established practice which confers 
particular privileges on a class arbitrarily 
selected from a large number of persons, all of whom 
stand in the same relation to the privileges granted 
and between whom and those not favored no reasonable 
distinction can be found. Unfair treatment or 
denial of normal privileges to persons because of their 
race, age, nationality or religion. A failure to treat 
all persons equally where no reasonable distinction can 
9 
be found between those favored and those not 
favored." (16) 
Eligible = "Fit and proper to be chosen; qualified to 
be elected. Capable of serving, legally qualified to 
serve." (17) 
Extra = "A Latin preposition, occurring in many legal 
phrases, and meaning beyond, except, without, out of, 
outside." (18) The term will be used in this study to 
denote extra legal organizations. 
Handicapped = "Any person who (a) has a physical or 
mental impairment which substantially limits one or 
more of such person's major life activities, (b) has a 
record of such an impairment, or (c) is regarded as 
having such an impairment." (19) 
Program, Institution = If the institution receives 
funds from the Federal Government then all programs of 
the institution are subject to Title IX legislation. 
( 2 0 )  
Program, Programmatic or program specific = If the 
program in question, ie. sports program, is not 
receiving Federal financing, then HEW has no 
jurisdiction in the matter. (21) 
Property right = "A generic term which refers to any 
type of right to specific property whether it is 
16 Henry Campbell Black, Joseph R. Nolan and M.J. 
Connolly, Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition,(St. Paul 
Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1979), 420. 
17 Ibid, 467. 
18 Ibid, 528. 
19 Statutes at Large, "The Rehabilitation Act of 1973", 
Public Law 92-318, 29 U.S.C.A. 706, March 23, 1972. 
20 Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (1982). 
This case is not cited to provide any information other than 
that of a definition for the two different interpretations 
of the term program. The findings of the court are not the 
focus of the information and are therefore not taken into 
consideration. 
21 Ibid. 
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personal or real property, tangible or intangible." 
( 2 2 )  
Secondary School = "A high school or preparatory school 
intermediate between the elementary school and college. 
(23) 
Writ of certiorari = "An order by the appellate court 
which is used when the court has discretion on whether 
or not to hear an appeal. If the writ is denied, the 
court refuses to hear the appeal and, in effect, the 
judgment below stands unchanged. If the writ is 
granted, then it has the effect of ordering the lower 
court to certify the record and send it up to the 
higher court which has used its discretion to hear the 
appeal." (24) 
METHODOLOGY 
All of the data for this research project came from 
materials already in existence. The information was 
gathered through several different means involving four main 
categories: [1] statutes, [2] constitutions, by-laws and 
eligibility requirements of state athletic associations, [3] 
court opinions, and [4] journal articles, books, studies, 
and dissertations. 
The statutes relevant to this study were found in 
Jackson Library at the University of North Carolina at 
22 Black, Nolan, and Connolly, 1096. 
23 Funk and Wagnalls Standard Desk Dictionary, 1985 
edition, s.v. "Secondary School." 
24 Ibid, 1443. 
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Greensboro. The statutes were located by using the index 
for the Statutes at Large listed by year in which the 
legislation was passed. Portions of the following statutes 
were used: "The Rehabilitation Act of 1973" (25), "Title IX" 
(26), and "The Education for AH Handicapped Children Act of 
1975". (27) Information gathered from these statutes was 
used as bench mark against which to test the legality of 
athletic association regulations. 
In order to test the legality of eligibility 
requirements in the different states, it was necessary to 
obtain from each state and the District of Columbia a copy 
of the by-laws, constitutions, and eligibility requirements 
under which each operated. This was accomplished through 
written communication with each of the fifty state athletic 
associations and the District of Columbia Athletic 
Association. All fifty-one of the athletic associations 
replied with copies of their association's handbook. These 
handbooks provided the information necessary to determine 
the eligibility requirements each association places on its 
athletes in the secondary schools. 
In identifying and locating court cases for the legal 
section of this research, the researcher used the following: 
The Yearbook of School Law (published by NOLPE), Corpus 
25 Statutes at Large, PL 93-112. 
26 Statutes at Large, PL 92-318. 
27 Statutes at Large, PL 94-142. 
Juris Secundum, The Deskbook Encyclopedia of American School 
Law, The Index to Legal Periodicals, and The American Digest 
System. When court cases were found, the list of cases was 
added to by pulling out the cases that had been cited by 
both lawyers as they presented their cases and by the j.udge 
in the opinion. Added to this were cases cited in articles 
taken from law journals. An examination of these sources 
has given an exhaustive list of cases to support this 
research. Court cases were secured from the following 
places: the library at The University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro, the library at Appalachian State University, the 
Buncombe County Law Library, and the McDowell County Law 
Library. Also used in this research were materials belonging 
to The McDowell County Schools. 
In researching the materials for the review of the 
literature, the writer acquired information through library 
research and through personal communications with 
organizations and other researchers. The library research 
involved a search of the Readers Guide, ERIC, a subject 
search of the card catalogue, a search of the Index to Legal 
Periodicals, a review of each edition of The Yearbook of 
School Law, 1972 - 1986, and Dissertation Abstracts. The 
topics used to search these different sources were: schools 
and school districts, eligibility, athletes, athletics, 
interscholastic athletics, extracurricular activities, 
extracurricular athletics and academic eligibility. 
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Personal communications involved correspondence with each of 
the fifty different state athletic associations and the 
District of Columbia athletic association. Personal 
communications also involved correspondence with the 
National Association of Secondary School Principals for 
copies of monographs. Personal communications also included 
letters to and an interview with Representative Wilhelmina 
Delco of the Texas House of Representatives. Representative 
Delco is a member of the Committee on Higher Education, and 
was a speaker at the North Carolina Principal Conference 
held in Wilmington, North Carolina in June of 1987. 
Representative Delco provided valuable information 
pertaining to Texas House Bill 72, better known as the "No 
pass, No play" legislation. (28) 
DELIMITATIONS 
This study dealt with athletic eligibility requirements 
and court cases resulting from challenges to these 
requirements which were decided between 1972 and 1987. This 
time span was chosen to include the passage of the 
"Education Amendments of 1972" of which Title IX was a large 
part, the passage of the "Rehabilitation Act of 1973" which 
guaranteed certain rights to a handicapped student, and the 
28 The Legislature of the State of Texas, House Bill 
72, passed June 23, 1984. 
passage of the "Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
of 1975" which is better known as Public Law 94-142. All 
three of these pieces of legislation had an effect on the 
eligibility requirements of each state athletic association 
and also on the decisions of the courts when dealing with 
cases involving students covered by these laws. Issues that 
were before the courts prior to this time involved topics 
that are no longer being challenged. The two major areas 
dealt with eligibility of married students and the right of 
athletic associations to exclude students who belonged to 
secret societies. This research focused on five areas of 
athletic eligibility: gender based discrimination, 
discrimination against the handicapped, transfer 
regulations, age limitations, and academic eligibility. The 
study has been arranged in a manner that will allow each of 
these five areas to be examined separately. This study did 
not cover limitations on participation in summer camp, nor 
did it involve a study of eligibility of married students. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OP THE LITERATURE 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide the reader with a review of 
the literature pertinent to this study. The chapter has 
been organized in such a way as to present the information 
by subject. The first part of the chapter will serve as an 
introduction to the chapter with an overview or outline of 
the information that follows. The topic of athletic 
eligibility has been divided into two parts. The first part 
begins with the inception of state athletic associations and 
continues until 1972. This section will cite only a few 
court cases that will present the direction of the courts to 
the reader. This time period has been dealt with in the 
history of the study. The years of 1972 through 1987 have 
been divided by topic to provide a more understandable 
methodology of presenting information. The areas presented 
from 1972 until 1987 include the following: gender based 
discrimination, discrimination against the handicapped, 
transfer regulations, age limitations, and academic 
eligibility. These topics have been presented individually 
for the purpose of clarity. 
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
In the late 1800's, athletics in secondary schools had 
grown large enough for people to notice and important enough 
to cause schools to go to unusual lengths to win, such as 
having adults participate with students on school teams. 
Some school administrators observed the need for some sort 
of organization in high school athletics that could set 
rules and enforce them in order to bring some direction to 
athletics and at the same time do away with some of the 
discrepancies that were then prevalent. (29) The Wisconsin 
Interscholastic Athletic Association (WIAA) was one of the 
first to form. "The WIAA had its earliest beginnings in 
late 1895 and early 1896, and the first set of rules was 
adopted in December of 1896". (30) Even though there were 
other states which formed athletic associations at the same 
time such as Michigan and Illinois, (31) the first legal 
challenges were against regulations created by local boards 
of education rather than against the newly formed athletic 
associations. 
In 1906 such a case came before the Supreme Court of 
the state of Washington, Wayland v. Board of School 
29 Shepard and Jamerson, 20. 
30 Handbook, 1986-1987, Wisconsin Interscholastic 
Athletic Association,(Stevens Point, Wisconsin: Wisconsin 
Interscholastic Athletic Association, 1986), 3. 
31 Shepard and Jamerson, 20. 
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Directors of District No. 1 of Seattle. (32) This case 
involved a challenge to the right of the local school board 
to make a regulation that prohibited members of a secret 
society, in this case a fraternity, from participation in 
any extracurricular activity which included sports. In the 
opinion of the court, the local board of education had the 
right to make rules that will protect the population of the 
school system it represents and also to enforce those rules. 
Therefore, George Wayland was ruled ineligible to 
participate in any extracurricular activity provided by the 
school. (33) In Durham, North Carolina, the board of 
education made a regulation that required students to sign a 
pledge that they were not nor would be in the future a 
member of any fraternity or secret organization that was not 
approved by the school board. 
Here appears a declaration that the signor is not a 
member or "pledge" of any fraternity or society not 
approved by the school board; that he will not join any 
such society or attend the meetings of same or any 
function sponsored by it; and that he will not 
contribute funds to or participate in any of the 
activities of any such organization. (34) 
Those students who refused to sign the pledge would be 
prohibited from participation in any extracurricular 
32 Wayland v. Board of School Directors of District No. 
1 of Seattle, 86 Pac 642 (1906). 
33 Ibid. 
34 Coggins v. Board of Education of City of Durham, 223 
N.C. 763, 756 (1943) 
activity. (35) John Coggins, Jr., was a member of a 
fraternity and also sought to participate on the school 
football team. His refusal to sign the pledge made him 
ineligible to participate. In the suit that followed, the 
court ruled that the school board had the right to make such 
a requirement of students; further, the board of education 
did not deny him the right to participate, but rather made 
it optional. The student was given the option of belonging 
to the fraternity, or dropping the fraternity and becoming 
eligible for participation on the school's football team. 
(36) Courts in Arkansas, Kansas, Ohio, and Texas also 
agreed with the right of the local school board to place 
restrictions on students who wish to participate in 
secondary school athletics. (37) 
In 1938, Billy Roberts became the first student to 
challenge the right of an athletic association to make and 
enforce rules of eligibility. (38) Billy, along with other 
teammates had received small football charms as gifts from 
35 Coggins v Board of Education of City of Durham, 28 
S.E. 2d 527 (N.C. 1944). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Court cases in these four states also support the 
right of the school board to exclude members of secret 
societies from participation in extracurricular activities. 
The cases are as follows: Isgrig v. Srygley, 197 S.W.2d 39 
(Ark. 1946)., Andeel v. Woods, 258 P.2d 285 (Kan. 1953)., 
Holroyd v. Eibling, 188 N.E.2d 797 (Ohio 1962)., and Wilson 
v. Abilene Independent School District, 190 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. 
1945) . 
38 Morris v. Roberts, 82 P.2d 1023 (Ok. 1938). 
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several fans. As a result they were in violation of the 
state athletic association's rule governing the acceptance 
of awards. The state athletic association ruled the 
students ineligible for a period of one year. In reaching 
its decision, the court looked at the fact that the Oklahoma 
High School Athletic Association was a voluntary 
organization and by joining the association, members had 
agreed to abide by the rules set forth by the organization. 
Therefore, the court found nothing unlawful in the rules of 
the association nor in its right to enforce those rules. 
(39) 
Since the first challenges, courts have upheld the 
right of athletic associations to both make and enforce 
rules governing athletic eligibility. This support has not 
been total but the overwhelming majority of court cases have 
upheld state athletic associations. 
A review of the history of eligibility and the courts 
showed that in the earlier cases, prior to 1972, the topics 
being considered were secret societies and married students. 
(40) The position of the courts, in regard to secret 
societies, has already been discussed earlier in this 
chapter. 
39 Ibid. 
40 E.C. Bolmeier, Legal Issues In Education, ed. J. 
David Mohler, "Legal Aspects of Extracurricular Activities 
In Secondary Schools", (Charlottesville, Virginia: The 
Michie Company, 1968), 247-256. 
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In 1959 one of the earliest cases challenging the right 
of a school board to make and enforce a rule that declared 
married students ineligible to participate in athletics was 
brought to the courts in Texas. (41) The decision of the 
court was one that would be followed for many years. The 
court upheld the right of the local school board to make and 
enforce eligibility rules against married students. (42) In 
making the rules pertaining to eligibility of married 
students, school boards have cited basically five reasons: 
[1] Married students assume new and serious 
responsibilities. Participation in extracurricular 
activities tends to interfere with discharging these 
responsibilities; 
[2] A basic education program is even more essential 
for married students. Therefore, full attention 
should be given to the school program in order that 
such students may achieve success; 
[3] Teenage marriages are on the increase. Marriage 
prior to the age set by law should be discouraged. 
Excluding married students from extracurricular 
activities may tend to discourage early marriages; 
[4] Married students need to spend time with their 
families in order that the marriage will have a better 
chance of being successful; 
[5] Married students are more likely to drop out of 
school. Hence, marriage should be discouraged among 
teenage students. (43) 
In cases decided before 1972, courts tended to agree with 
the reasoning of the court in Kissick which recognized that 
the dropout rate of students could be positively affected by 
41 Kissick v. Garland Independent School District, 330 
S.W. 2d. 708 (Tex. 1959). 
42 Ibid. 
43 Moran v. School District #7, Yellowstone County, 350 
P.Supp. 1180, 1182-1183 (D. Mont. 1972) 
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the creation and enforcement of eligibility rules that 
prohibited the participation of married students. (44) In 
1971 and 1972, two cases came before the courts that gave 
new direction to the way athletic associations and local 
boards of education looked at married students. In Moran v. 
School District #7, Yellowstone County, the court decided in 
favor of the student, Steve Moran, and enjoined the school 
district from enforcing its regulation prohibiting the 
participation of married students in extracurricular 
activities. (45) In a similar case the court allowed Soni 
Romans to participate in extracurricular activities stating 
that the regulation of the school board that had rendered 
her ineligible was violative of her equal protection rights. 
(46) No longer would a majority of the courts uphold the 
right of the athletic associations and local boards of 
education to make and enforce rules governing the 
eligibility of married students. 
The early "Seventies" saw a decline in the types of 
litigation that had dominated the courts in regard to 
athletic eligibility and a new challenge came to the 
forefront. Female athletes were beginning to demand the 
right to participate in athletics in the school setting. In 
order for this to take place there had to be a change in the 
44 Kissick v. Garland Independent School District. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Romans v. Crenshaw, 354 F.Supp. 808 (S.D. Tex. 1971). 
status quo attitude? "When it comes to U.S. athletics, the 
female has been a loser, relegated by males to the 
sidelines. But a revolution looms." (47) The revolution 
brought demands of equality for female athletes that would 
involve the courts into the late 1980's. 
GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATION 
The early 1970's witnessed the introduction of a new 
area of litigation pertaining to athletic eligibility, that 
of gender-based discrimination. Prior to the passage of 
Title IX, it was common for state athletic associations to 
have rules much like the one published by the Minnesota 
State High School League in its handbook for 1971-72. The 
rule stated: "Girls shall be prohibited from participation 
in the boys' interscholastic athletic program either as a 
member of the boys' team or a member of the girls' team 
playing the boys' team. The girls' team shall not accept 
male members. (48) This particular rule came under attack 
in Brenden v. Independent School District. As a result of 
this court action two girls, Peggy Brenden and Antoinette 
St. Pierre, were granted permission to participate along 
with male students on the tennis, cross country running and 
47 Bill Gilbert and Nancy Williamson, "Sport is Unfair 
to Women," Sports Illustrated 38 (May 28, 1973): 92. 
48 Brenden v. Independent School District, 477 F.2d. 
1202, 1294 (8th Cir. 1973) 
skiing teams. (49) Early court cases such as Brenden 
usually involved suit against athletic associations charging 
that the associations1 rules violated female students' 
rights guaranteed to them under the equal protection clause 
of the fourteenth amendment. On June 23, 1972, Congress 
passed into law what has come to be known as "Title IX". 
(50) Title IX is part of the "Education Amendment of 1972" 
and in part states: "No person in the United States shall, 
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance..." (51) However, in court cases 
charging Title IX violations, a problem has arisen with the 
definition of the term program. Some groups define this 
section of Title IX to mean that the sports program must be 
receiving federal assistance before the sports program is 
required to abide by the Title IX legislation. However, 
there are other groups who interpret the section to mean 
that if a school is receiving federal assistance, then all 
of the programs including the sports program are subject to 
Title IX legislation. (52) The Department of Health 
49 Ibid. 
50 Statutes at Large, PL 92-318. 
51 Ibid. p.373. 
52 Herb Appenzeller, "Title IX: After Grove City", 
Sports and Law: Contemporary Issues, (Charlottesville, 
Virginia: The Michie Company, 1985), 50-51. 
Education and Welfare (HEW) pushed for the definition of 
program to be wide and to include all areas of a school that 
received federal money for any part of the school. This was 
referred to as the institution approach. (53) "In a 
decision dated 23 February 1981, U.S. District Judge Charles 
W. Joiner decided squarely for the programmatic approach." 
(54) The programmatic approach to Title IX interpretation 
promoted the idea that only the programs receiving federal 
financing could be held responsible for enforcing the 
legislation. (55) In 1982 a case began that when completed 
would answer the question of scope of program. The case did 
not deal with athletic eligibility in the secondary schools, 
but the decision can be applied at any level either 
secondary or post-secondary. In Grove City v. Bell, 687 
F.2d 684 (1982), the court agreed with HEW and ruled that 
program would be defined to mean institution, and that if 
any part of the institution, or any student of the 
institution were to receive federal funds then all the 
programs of the school would be subject to the direction of 
Title IX. (56) On appeal the Supreme Court agreed to hear 
the case and in 1984 settled the question. In Grove City v. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Thomas J. Flygare, "Schools and the Law", Phi Delta 
Kappan, 62, no. 10 June 1981, 741. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Appenzeller, Sports and Law: Contemporary Issues, 
49-51. 
Belly 104 S.Ct.1211 (1984), the Supreme Court stated that 
Title IX enforcement is limited to the specific program 
receiving the federal funds. (57) On March 22, 1988, 
congress overrode President Reagan's veto of a major civil 
rights bill. (58) This bill is designed to clarify 
legislation already in existence protecting women, 
minorities, the elderly and the handicapped from 
discrimination. The bill states in part: "Compliance is 
required throughout entire colleges, universities and public 
school systems if any program or activity receives federal 
aid." (59) This bill invalidates the decision of the court 
in Grove City v. Bell, and changes the definition from 
program specific to an institution approach to 
interpretation of Title IX. 
With the definition of program settled, the courts 
would continue to hear cases that had been brought against 
schools, boards of education, and athletic associations 
charging them with sex discrimination. As a result most 
athletic associations have developed rules and regulations 
which govern the participation of female athletic 
competition. These rules have been developed to reflect the 
direction of the courts. Most states have enacted rules 
57 Ibid. 
58 "Reagan Veto of Civil Rights Bill Toppled", The 
Asheville Citizen, 23 March 1988, sec. A, p. 1. 
59 Ibid. 
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that are similar to the one in North Carolina, (60) which 
states: 
Women shall not participate on a men's interscholastic 
athletic team where the school has a women's team in 
the same sport or where a school sends an entry to the 
women's state play-offs in that sport. In cases where 
women are permitted on a men's team/ the school 
forfeits all participation in the women's play-offs in 
the same sport. Men's rules will be used where women 
play on men's te^ms. Under no condition shall men 
participate on women's teams in any sport. (61) 
Since Title IX was passed in 1972, court cases 
involving sex discrimination have dealt with three basic 
areas: [1] those in which females have totally been denied 
the opportunity to participate in athletics, [2] those that 
distinguish between contact and non-contact sports, and [3] 
those that have involved the legality of offering separate 
teams and also what has to be done to achieve equality in 
programs when they are offered separately. (62) All of 
these areas were addressed on April 15, 1977, when the 
United States District Court, for the District of Colorado 
decided the case of Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F.Supp. 164 
(1977). This case dealt with a female student and her 
desire to participate on the school soccer team. Her state 
had a rule that prohibited females from participating on a 
60 This statement is made after this researcher 
reviewed the regulations published by the athletic 
associations of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. 
61 Strunk, 26. 
62 Gwendolyn H. Gregory, School Law in Contemporary 
Society, (Topeka: National Organization on Legal Problems 
of Education, 1980), 61. 
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male team in a contact sport. The court gave the school 
district an alternative. "The school district had the 
option of discontinuing soccer, fielding separate teams for 
males and females with substantially equal support and 
substantially comparable programs, or permitting both sexes 
to compete on the same team." (63) The decision reached in 
Hoover has served as a standard for cases that have followed 
dealing with sex discrimination. But, even this leaves some 
of the questions unanswered. 
In 1896, Plessy v. Ferguson (64) created what has been 
referred to as the separate but equal doctrine. At the 
point of its inception, the topic before the courts was one 
of race discrimination. The decision remained in effect 
until it was struck down as being unconstitutional by the 
courts in Brown. (65) The same legal doctrine that had been 
ruled unconstitutional in dealing with race discrimination 
was now being used to solve a similar problem of dealing 
with the female athlete and sex discrimination. "The 
separate but equal doctrine was rejected in race 
discrimination cases. Separate was deemed to be inherently 
63 Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F.Supp. 164, 172 (D. Col. 
1977) 
64 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) 
65 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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unequal as it carried the stigma of inferiority." (66) 
However, in dealing with female athletes, separate and equal 
teams are the best way to serve the interests of the two 
different classes. (67) It is because of the two different 
classes which are created by male and female athletes that 
some writers believe that the separate but equal approach to 
athletic teams is the best solution. In each class, the 
female champion is not inferior to the male champion in the 
same sport. Like classifications in boxing or wrestling, 
each winner is the champion of his class. So it is with the 
female and the male champion, each belongs to different 
classes. (68) In developing their guidelines, state 
athletic associations have followed guidelines set by the 
court in Hoover v. Meilklejohn and have set up athletic 
competition for females on a separate but equal basis. 
However, some states have gone a step further and have made 
an effort to protect exceptional female athletes who could 
possibly compete with males. In New York separate but equal 
teams are provided for athletes, but an exceptional female 
athlete is given the choice of participating on the male 
team in order to be properly challenged and given equal 
66 Candace J. Fabri and Elaine S. Fox, "The Female High 
School Athlete and Interscholastic Sports", Journal of Law & 
Education 4 no. 2 (1975): 299. 
67 Ibid. 299-300. 
68 Ibid, 299. 
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opportunity for advancement. (69) In states such as New 
York, athletic associations have gone past what has been set 
up by the courts as being acceptable. 
Despite attempts to equalize the opportunities of both 
males and females in secondary school athletics, there 
always seems to be a small group of individuals who are at a 
disadvantage. Therefore some writers feel that the ideal 
solution to the problem would be to field three teams. 
These three teams would be comprised of one team for males 
only, one team for females only, and one team, a "prestige 
factor" team, that would be comprised of both males and 
females that would be fielded on the basis of talent only. 
(70) This solution, however fair, is hampered by the cost 
of running three programs. 
In the area of athletic eligibility for female 
athletes, state athletic associations have changed as the 
courts and Title IX legislation have made them change. 
Rules and regulations of the different athletic associations 
are now written to reflect the position of the court at the 
present time. That position is clearly separate but equal 
teams for males and females. 
69 Handbook, 1986-1988, New York State Public High 
School Athletic Association, (Delmar, New York: New York 
State Public High School Athletic Association, 1986), 63. 
70 Fabri, 300. 
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DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE HANDICAPPED 
In dealing with athletic eligibility, the word 
handicapped can refer to basically two different areas. A 
student can be handicapped either physically or mentally. 
In order to be classified as handicapped, a student must 
meet the requirements outlined in The Rehabilitation Act of 
1973. This act defines handicapped as follows: 
Any person who (a) has a physical or mental impairment 
which substantially limits one or more of such person's 
major life activities, (b) has a record of such an 
impairment, or (c) is regarded as having such an 
impairment. (71) 
In 1973 Congress passed The Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
In addition to defining the handicapped person, section 504 
of this Act states: 
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the 
United States, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, 
be excluded from the participation in be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance. (72) 
As a result of this legislation, a new group of students are 
making demands to be included in secondary school athletics. 
"A new group has emerged: students with handicapping 
conditions who insist that federal legislation prohibits 
71 Statutes at Large, PL 92-318. 
72 Ibid. 
discrimination against them." (73) Five years after the 
bill was passed, the Department of Health Education and 
Welfare reported that it had received 377 claims pertaining 
to handicapped persons who charged discrimination. This was 
more than the total of claims from sex discrimination 
charges and race discrimination charges combined. (74) 
Students with mental handicaps find it difficult to 
fulfill the four years of eligibility allotted by all fifty-
one athletic associations. In the majority of cases, these 
students have been detained somewhere in their educational 
process and therefore reach the maximum age limit before 
they can compete for four years. For this reason 
handicapped students and their parents have requested relief 
from the courts and have asked for extensions of the age 
limit for handicapped students. (75) At present this age 
limit is set by each state and there are some discrepancies 
in the rules. A review of the age requirements established 
by the athletic associations of the fifty states and the 
District of Columbia reveals that forty of the athletic 
associations have set the maximum age limit at nineteen, ten 
of the associations have set the limit at twenty, and one 
73 Herb Appenzeller, The Right to participate; The law 
and Individuals With Handicapping Conditions in Physical 
Education and Sports (Charlottesville: The Michie Company, 
1983) 175. 
74 Herb Appenzeller and Thomas Appenzeller, Sports and 
the Courts (Charlottesville: The Michie Company, 1980), 33. 
75 Appenzeller, The Right to Participate, 143. 
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has set the limit at eighteen years and nine months. The 
National Federation has set the recommended limit at 
nineteen years. (See Appendix B) In dealing with the 
question of age, the courts have, by majority, supported 
athletic associations and their right to establish age 
regulations. (76) An example of the courts' reasoning can 
s 
be found in Cavallaro v. Ambach. (77) Due to a neurological 
impairment Daniel Cavallaro had been retained in the lower 
grades and had reached the age of nineteen prior to entering 
his senior year. He was ruled ineligible for participation 
on his high school wrestling team. In court Judge Telesca 
stated: 
...that where high school senior classified as 
neurologically impaired was prohibited from 
participating in interscholastic athletics because 
he had reached age of 19, and was not treated any 
differently than any other nonphysically handicapped 
19-year-old students, student could not prevail in 
handicap discrimination and equal protection action 
brought against state education officials....the 
potential hardship to Daniel if the injunction does not 
issue fails to outweigh the more substantial 
probability of hardships created by possible injuries 
to younger wrestlers caused by their competition with a 
physically mature 19 year old. (78) 
In this type of case the major consideration is the safety 
of the other athletes. When dealing with handicapped 
students, athletic associations have refused to show any 
76 Ibid., 144-146. 
77 Cavallaro By Cavallaro v. Ambach, 575 F.Supp. 171 
(W.D. New York, 1983). 
78 Ibid., 172-175. 
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flexibility pertaining to age limitations. However, a 
review of the regulations of the fifty state athletic 
associations and the District of Columbia reveals that a 
majority of the associations do have hardship rules. The 
rules follow basically the same format and purpose. "The 
purpose of the hardship rule is to provide due process." 
(79) 
...except for the eligibility rule in regard to age, 
the Board of directors shall have the authority to set 
aside the effect of any eligibility rule when in the 
opinion of the Board the rule fails to accomplish the 
purpose for which it is intended and when the rule 
works an undue hardship upon the student. (80) 
This regulation from the North Carolina Athletic Association 
serves as an example of the Association's reluctance to 
deviate from the age limitation and also its willingness to 
bend the other regulations to accommodate the handicapped 
student. State athletic association regulations continue to 
evolve to reflect the opinions of the courts. 
The group of students who have been most active in 
their appeals to the courts are the students with physical 
handicaps. The physically handicapped student enjoys the 
same rights as the mentally handicapped student under the 
protection of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
(81) Students with physical handicaps encounter their first 
79 Strunk, North Carolina High School Athletic 
Association Handbook, 74. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Statutes at Large, PL 92-318. 
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barriers to athletic competition not from the state athletic 
associations, but rather from the medical community. All 
states require that students have physical examinations and 
receive an approval from a physician in order to participate 
in an athletic program. A majority of the examining 
physicians seem to consult the regulations set forth by the 
American Medical Association (AMA) when making 
determinations concerning athletic eligibility. In its 
guide the AMA sets forth a number of disqualifying 
conditions such as absence of an eye, respiratory problems, 
cardiovascular problems, liver disorders, and other physical 
impairments. (82) In making its regulations the AMA divided 
sports into four categories: collision sports, contact 
sports, non-contact sports, and others. (83) The AMA then 
proceeded to make recommendations as to whether or not it 
felt that it was safe for a handicapped athlete to 
participate in each category based upon his or her 
individual handicap. These guidelines were intended to 
serve as recommendations, but in some situations were 
interpreted as being specific, controlling guidelines. The 
AMA stated that the absence of one kidney should cause a 
student to be ineligible for participation in collision as 
82 Disqualifying Conditions for Sports Participation, 
Medical Evaluation of the Athlete - A Guide, (Chicago: The 
American Medical Association, 1977). 
83 Ibid. 
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well as contact sports. (84) However in Poole v. South 
Plainfield Board of Education, the court ruled that refusing 
to allow Richard Poole to participate in wrestling, which 
the AMA classified as a contact sport, because he had only 
one kidney, was a violation of section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. (85) Also, in Grube v. 
Bethlehem Area School District, the court found that the 
refusal to allow Richard Grube to participate in football 
because he had only one kidney was a violation of section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, even though football 
was considered a collision sport and the AMA recommended 
against his participation. (86) 
In 1975 Congress passed the "Education for all 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975", better known as PL 94-
142. (87) The area of this legislation that impacts the 
hardest on athletic eligibility is the section that requires 
that an Individualized Educational Program (IEP) be 
developed for each handicapped student. A review of 
athletic association guidelines reveals that ten of these 
associations provide for changes in eligibility rulings 
based upon the stipulations of a student's IEP. The demand 
84 Ibid. 
85 Poole v. South Plainfield Board of Education, 490 
F.Supp. 948 (D. N.J. 1980). 
86 Grube v. Bethlehem Area School District, 550 F.Supp. 
418 (E.D. Penn. 1982) 
87 Statutes at Large, PL 94-142. 
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to provide equal opportunity and due process to a 
handicapped student has caused athletic associations to make 
changes in their regulations. 
No longer can individuals be denied opportunities to 
participate in sports activities at any level because 
of handicapping conditions. Constitutionally 
guaranteed rights of individuals with handicapping 
conditions necessitate organizations sponsoring sports 
activities to ensure equal opportunities for 
individuals with handicapping conditions. (88) 
In situations such as these, making decisions concerning 
eligibility for handicapped students can become a no-win 
situation for a school administrator and for a board of 
education. 
What if a student in one of your high schools - a 
student who was a hemophiliac - wanted to play 
football? Or if a student with a hernia wanted to go 
out for soccer? Or if an epileptic student wanted to 
play field hockey? Your first reaction might be to 
tell these students No. You don't want to risk injury 
to them or lawsuits against your school system, you 
reason, so saying No is a prudent decision. (89) 
To deny a student the opportunity to participate might be 
the logical thing to do. However, according to the ruling 
in Poole, a board of education has no right to deny a 
handicapped student the right to participate if the parents 
are aware of the dangers and still encourage the student to 
88 Julian U. Stein, "New vistas in competitive sports 
for athletes with handicapping conditions," Exceptional 
Education Quarterly 3, (May 1982): 29. 
89 Thomas J. pepe and Thomas B. Mooney, "Weigh these 
complex issues about handicapped kids in athletics." The 
American School Board Journal 169 (February 1982) : 31. 
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participate. (90) 
No longer can a school system rely totally on the 
school physician and the recommendations of the AMA. 
If your school system were to follow the AMA sports 
exclusion guidelines to prohibit students with specific 
handicaps from playing contact sports, you might find 
yourself defending that policy in court. Reason: 
General rules on disqualifying handicapped students do 
not take into account individual differences or the 
willingness of students and their parents to take risks 
to participate in contact sports. (91) 
All dealings with handicapped students must be on an 
individual basis and at times in line with students' IEP. 
The question of eligibility for handicapped students is 
complex and controversial. A handicapped student has the 
same desire to excel and be the sports hero that other young 
people have. The question of eligibility must be answered 
by the courts. (92) 
TRANSFER REGULATIONS 
Transfer rules were originally established to prevent 
highly talented student athletes from being recruited by 
high schools who were interested in fielding a superior 
90 Poole v. South Plainfield Board of Education, 948. 
91 Pepe and Mooney, 32. 
92 Appenzeller and Appenzeller, Sports and the Courts, 
54. 
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team. (93) 
In the formative years of state athletic associations, 
different schools operated under different rules. One of 
the jobs of the athletic associations was to try to regulate 
the recruiting of athletes. Young athletes who were 
extremely talented would be approached by a person or 
persons representing a school and would be pressured to move 
from one location to another in order to represent that 
* 
school in high school athletics. The process worked much 
the same as the present day college recruiting does. (94) 
The athletic associations had to develop a method of 
controlling the recruiting of students. 
The usual method is the transfer rule. While each 
state words the rule differently, the basic idea is 
that a student who changes schools is ineligible for a 
certain period of time after the change, generally one 
year. The rationale behind the rule is that players 
will not move from one school to another if they know 
they will not be allowed to participate. Additionally, 
the players recruited are generally juniors or seniors. 
Thus, the loss of a year's playing time would be at the 
athlete's peak period of performance and would damage 
any chance of a college scholarship. (95) 
These first transfer rules were simply stated and provided 
that a student was ineligible for a period of time ,usually 
93 John L. Strope, Jr., School Activities and the Law 
(Reston, Virginia: The National Association of Secondary 
School Principals, 1984), 12. 
94 Charles Everett Mullins, "Family Law Issues in High 
School Athletic Eligibility: Equal Protection v. The 
Transfer Rule," Journal of Family Law University of 
Louisville School of Law 20 (1981-82) : 293. 
95 Ibid. 
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one semester or one year from the time of the transfer from 
one high school to another. (96) Some state athletic 
associations continued to apply this blanket ruling to all 
transfer students well into the 1980's. Court action 
brought against athletic associations challenging the 
legality of these transfer rulings were usually greeted with 
failure. Courts considered the athletic associations to be 
voluntary organizations and that by volunteering to join the 
association the school had agreed to abide by the rules and 
regulations of said association. (97) As society has become 
more mobile, rules governing the transfer of students have 
had to change to keep pace. A review of the regulations of 
athletic associations governing the student's right to 
transfer and be eligible for participation in athletics 
reveals that all of the athletic associations have made 
adjustments in their rules to allow for special situations 
that might arise. Students who move with their parents are 
considered to be bonafide transfers and those students are 
considered eligible with no penalty. Students transferring 
without the corresponding change of residence are penalized 
from fourteen calendar days in New York to the more accepted 
one year in most states. (See appendix E) Even with 
increasing flexibility of the current transfer rules, there 
are still problems to be solved. The most pressing problem 
96 Strope, 12. 
97 Mullins, 295. 
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seems to be the charge that transfer rules do not control 
the problem that they were designed to control. 
Under one view, then, the transfer rules represent a 
haltering form of regulation. At the same time that 
the rules fail to except the compelling cases of some 
persons whose transfers were not athletically 
motivated, they also leave unregulated transfers for 
which improved athletic opportunities were the sole 
motivation. (98) 
The feeling by some is that students who are blessed with 
wealthy parents are protected from the transfer rule. If a 
student wants to transfer to another school because of 
better competition or because of better coaching, and his 
parents have the money to sell their current residence and 
move to the new location and buy a new residence, then in 
every state this is considered to be a bonafide move and the 
student is eligible with no penalty. (99) Therefore those 
who have the means may have a way around the transfer rule 
in every state. This method of avoiding the transfer rule 
is also a real possibility for those who rent apartments and 
are willing to move to pursue their child's interest in 
sports. (100) There is yet another group that can 
circumvent the transfer rules. Some large companies will 
arrange for transfers of employees whose children are 
98 John C. Weistart, "Rule Making in Interscholastic 
Sports: The Basis of Judicial Review," Journal of Law & 
Education 11 (July 1982) , 298. 
99 Ibid., 297. 
100 Ibid. 
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skilled athletically. (101) Here again the corresponding 
move of the parent will allow the student to enjoy instant 
eligibility in all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia. Therefore, transfer rules have been charged with 
being "simultaneously over-inclusive and incomplete in their 
coverage". (102) 
Another common means of attacking transfer rules is 
through charges of violation of the fourteenth amendment. 
The fourteenth amendment states in part: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. (103) 
In order for the transfer rules to be challenged using the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the 
rule must create more than one classification of people 
either on its face or in its application. (104) Transfer 
rules will usually create at least two classifications of 
students, those who move with their parents and those who do 
not. In cases where challenges to the transfer rules have 
been successful it is the creating of the two broad 
101 Ibid., 298. 
102 Ibid., 297. 
103 Amendments To The Constitution, Article XIV, sec. 1. 
104 John C. Weistart and Cym H. Lowell, The Law Of 
Sports, (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-merrill Company, Inc., 
1979), 66. 
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categories that have allowed the courts to find in favor of 
the student. (105) In these successful cases one 
classification of student is one who has moved with his 
parents and is therefore considered to be a bonafide 
transfer. All others are grouped in the other category of 
illegal transfers. 
The bylaws, in essence, create an irrebuttable 
conclusion of law that all other transferees have been 
the victims of unscrupulous practices. This is 
precisely where the rules sweep too broadly, they 
create an over-inclusive class - those who move from 
one school to another for reasons wholly unrelated to 
athletics are grouped together with those who have been 
recruited or who have "jumped" for athletic reasons. 
(106) 
As courts began to recognize that athletic association rules 
pertaining to student transfers were over-inclusive and they 
swept too broadly, athletic associations began to change 
their rules. The new direction was to try to design a rule 
that would affect only those students it was intended to 
regulate. 
Even though there were losses for the athletic 
associations, the majority of the cases in the 1970's and 
1980's supported the right of the associations and local 
boards of education to make and enforce transfer rules. In 
general the courts will uphold the athletic association 
rules if they have a rational relationship to legitimate 
105 Sturrup v. Mahan, 305 N.E.2d 877 (Ind. 1974). 
106 Ibid., 881. 
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state interests. (107) 
Transfer rules have changed during the '70's and ' 8Q's 
so as to penalize only those who transfer for athletic 
reasons. However, the rules with their exceptions and 
hardship clauses are still often over-inclusive and often 
cause a loss of eligibility to a student who transferred for 
reasons other than athletics. Even in those cases the 
courts have upheld the athletic associations most of the 
time. 
AGE LIMITATIONS 
A review of athletic association regulations for the 
fifty states and the District of Columbia reveals that every 
state has set an age limit for athletic eligibility. (See 
Appendix B) In addition to the rules governing age, all of 
the athletic associations have added what is known as an 
eight semester rule. (See Appendix C) The justification 
for both of these rules is somewhat the same. "These rules 
are intended to ensure fair competition, protect the younger 
and less mature athletes from older athletes, prevent 
academic decisions from being made for athletic purposes, 
and avoid rewarding academic failure." (108) 
107 The Yearbook Of School Law 1983, ed. Philip K. 
Piele (Topeka: National Organization On Legal Problems Of 
Education, 1983), 178. 
108 Strope, 18. 
"Years ago when high school athletics began, 
competition was informal and unguided. Abuses were 
prevalent as adults played with students, rules were vague 
or non-existent, and an absence of discipline endangered the 
program." (109) One of the first abuses to be addressed was 
that of adults participating with students. The 
justification of such rules has always been to protect a 
younger athlete from physical harm and to ensure that as 
many young students as possible be able to participate. 
Even with the age rules and the attention given to 
protecting young athletes from older students, there can 
still be damage. Edgar Barrett III was a student in 
Wilmington, North Carolina. (110) During a football game a 
collision occurred with a player from an opposing school. 
As a result of that collision Barrett died. The student who 
had been involved in the collision with Barrett was twenty 
years old. It was discovered that by accident a mistake had 
been made in the preparation of the ineligibility list and 
that the older student had been overlooked. The dead 
youth's father brought charges against the school charging 
neglegence in filing an eligibility list that was incorrect. 
109 Letter received from Charlie Adams, Director of 
North Carolina High School Athletic Association, 31 March 1986. 
110 Barrett v. Phillips, 223 S.E.2d 918 (N.C. App. 1976). 
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Also, that negligence resulted in the death of his son. 
(Ill) In the case the defendants were granted summary 
judgment. (112) To grant summary judgment means: 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits any party to a 
civil action to move for a summary judgement on a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim when he believes 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
that he is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. The 
motion may be directed toward all or part of a claim or 
defense and it may be made on the basis of the 
pleadings or other portions of the record in the case 
or it may be supported by affidavits and a variety of 
outside material. (113) 
Even though the age of the student involved was not proven 
to be the cause of Barrett's death, this case emphasizes the 
seriousness of the situation that led state athletic 
associations to develop rules that govern the age limit of 
high school participants. 
All state athletic associations and the District of 
Columbia have established age requirements. Those age 
limits range from eighteen years and nine months in Hawaii 
to twenty years in ten of the states. The National 
Federation recommends an age limit of nineteen. (See 
Appendix B) 
In defending their age regulations, athletic 
associations have had numerous challenges but few successes. 
"Two Florida cases represent exceptions to the consistent 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Black, 1287. 
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course of judicial opinions that uphold these rules both as 
written and as applied." (114) Dennis Lee had been a 
student in California. He moved to Florida and began his 
senior year. In the meantime he had been out of school for 
one year because of the necessity of supporting his family. 
He was ruled ineligible in the state of Florida. In looking 
at the nature of the hardship the court of appeals of 
Florida gave him permission to play. (115) 
The Florida courts acted similarly when dealing with 
the case of Aaron Bryant. Bryant's hardship was of a 
personal nature and he claimed that his participation in 
basketball helped his attitude, his grades, and his social 
maturity and discipline. The Florida court refused to allow 
the Florida High School Activities Association to invoke its 
rule. (116) 
Even though these two cases have been decided contrary 
to the rules of the athletic associations, the majority of 
the cases have supported rules governing age and attendance. 
Other persons who have challenged the age rules of 
state athletic associations have done so on the basis that 
the rules were in violation of their rights granted by 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Public Law 94-142 
114 Strope, 18. 
115 Lee v. Florida High School Activities Association, 
Inc. 291 So.2d 636 (Fla. App. 1974). 
116 Florida High School Activities Association v. 
Bryant, 313 So.2d 57 (Fla. App. 1975). 
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of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. in these 
cases where students were held back for academic rather than 
athletic purposes the courts have been consistent in 
upholding the age rules. (117) These courts have recognized 
the need to set age limits and those limits must be 
preserved for the protection of younger students. 
In making its decisions the courts have looked at the 
reason for establishing the rules and have found that they 
are needed. "A maximum age rule of nineteen years of age 
has been held to be reasonable in light of the objective of 
fostering safety and fairness in competition." (118) 
ACADEMIC ELIGIBILITY 
Some people would agree that academics and athletics 
are two separate and distinct programmatic areas and that 
the two would not come in conflict with each other. 
However, in the last few years there has been considerable 
attention drawn to the link between athletics and academics. 
Does one have an effect over the other? 
117 Chambers v. Massachusetts Secondary School 
Principals Association, Inc., Superior Court, No. 9641, Jan. 
1978. , McNulty v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic 
Association, Superior Court, No. 37053, Jan. 1979. These 
two cases are representative of how the courts have viewed 
the challenges against the age rules that have been 
established by the state athletic associations. 
118 Deskbook Encyclopedia Of American School Law, 7th 
ed. s.v. "Maximum Age Rules." 
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Over the period of the last twenty-five years secondary 
education has seen a growing interest in athletics 
accompanied with some academic abuses. There have been 
stories of student grades being changed to allow an athlete 
to compete in athletic competition; there have been stories 
of transcripts being falsified to allow athletes to gain 
entrance into a college; and there have been many other 
stories of abuse of the educational process in order to 
preserve the athletic program of a school. The origin of 
this abuse of the grading system in favor of the athlete is 
not known but the results can be seen, and must be dealt 
with. 
Since 1981 there has been an emphasis on academics and 
a return to basics in curriculum. With this heightened 
interest in academic achievement came a closer look at what 
was happening with athletics. Legislators began to look at 
the problems facing student athletes and decided to take 
upon themselves the project of bringing academics and 
athletics in line. 
Increased pressure on academics has resulted in states 
attempting to exert more control over student eligibility 
for participation in interscholastic athletics. A review of 
the rules of athletic associations from the fifty states and 
the District of Columbia reveal a wide range in eligibility 
requirements pertaining to academic eligibility. Maryland, 
New York, and Vermont are representative of the low end of 
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the scale and have no minimum requirement for academic 
eligibility. Hawaii does not set a state minimum but rather 
leaves academic eligibility up to the individual 
conferences. The other extreme is represented by Texas. In 
Texas no student can be eligible to participate who has 
failed any course. A student athlete must pass every course 
he or she is attempting in order to maintain athletic 
eligibility. (For a complete listing of state athletic 
association requirements pertaining to academic eligibility, 
see appendix D.) 
It is not always the athletic association that sets the 
tough standards for academic eligibility. In some 
situations the state school board or the state legislature 
becomes involved in setting academic standards. On August 
12, 1983, the West Virginia State Board of Education adopted 
a new policy governing academic and attendance requirements 
for participation in extracurricular activities to 
take effect at the end of the first semester of the 1983-84 
school year. (119) In part that regulation states: 
In order to participate in the extracurricular 
activities to which this policy applies, a student must: 
[1] maintain a 2.0 average 
a. A 2.0 average is defined as a grade-point average 
(GPA) of 2.0 or better on a scale where an "A" mark 
earns 4 points, a MB" is awarded 3 points, a "C" is 
worth 2 points, a "D" is given a value of 1 point, and 
an "P" is worth 0 points. 
119 Bailey v. Truby, 321 S.E.2d. 302 (W.Va. 1984). 
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b. In computing a student's "gradepoint average" (GPA) 
for purpose of this policy, all subjects undertaken by 
the student and for which a final grade is recorded are 
to be considered. The total number of classes taken is 
divided into the total number of "gradepoints" earned 
to determine the GPA. Classes for which a pass/fail is 
awarded will be included in computing the GPA only if 
the student failed the class. 
c. The student's eligibility will be determined for 
each semester by his or her GPA the previous semester. 
d. In the case of handicapped students, grades 
received from placements in regular classrooms should 
be included when computing the GPA. For handicapped 
students placed in ungraded programs, consideration 
should be given to their achievement in those 
programs." (120) 
The action of the West Virginia Board of Education did not 
require the student to pass all of his or her subjects to 
remain eligible, but required only that the student maintain 
a 2.0 GPA. The state required that each local board of 
education adopt the state guideline. However, the state did 
not forbid a local unit from adding to the state 
requirement. In Kanawha, West Virginia, the local board of 
education did just that and required that the students in 
Kanawha District pass all of the courses attempted in 
addition to maintaining a 2.0 GPA. (121) 
The most publicized of these academic eligibility rules 
was passed by the Texas State Legislature. The "no pass, no 
play" rule became effective in 1985. The "no pass, no play" 
rule was only a small part of Texas House Bill 72 which was 
120 West Virginia State Board of Education Policy 
2436.10. 
121 Bailey v. Truby. 
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aimed at educational reform in all areas of public 
education. (122) Section 21.920 of House Bill 72 states in 
part: 
a.The State Board of Education by rule shall limit 
participation in and practice for extracurricular 
activities during the school day and the school week. 
b. A student enrolled in a school district in this 
state shall be suspended from participation in any 
extracurricular activity sponsored or sanctioned by the 
school district during the grade reporting period after 
a grade reporting period which the student received a 
grade lower than the equivalent of 70 on a scale of 100 
in any academic class. The campus principal may remove 
this suspension if the class is an identified honors or 
advanced class. 
c. In order to be eligible to participate in an 
extracurricular activity event for a six weeks period 
following the initial six weeks period of a school 
year, a student must not have a recorded grade average 
lower than 70 on a scale of 0 to 100 in any course for 
that preceding six weeks period. 
d. A student whose recorded six weeks grade average in 
any course is lower that 70 at the end of a six week 
period shall be suspended from participation in any 
extracurricular activity event during succeeding six 
weeks periods until the end of a six weeks period 
during hich such student achieves a course grade 
average for that six weeks of at least 70 in each 
course. 
e. Such suspension shall become effective seven days 
after the last day of the six weeks period during which 
the grade lower than 70 was earned. 
f. At the end of the first three weeks of a grading 
period, the school district shall send notices of 
progress to the parent or guardian of a student whose 
grade average in any class is lower than 70 or whose 
grade average is deemed borderline by the district. 
The district shall make such information available to 
sponsors of extracurricular activities in which the 
student participates. 
122 Representative Wilhelmina Delco, interview by 
author, Wilmington, North Carolina, 15 July 1987. 
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g. A student receiving an incomplete in a course is 
considered ineligible until the incomplete is replaced 
with a passing grade for the grading period. (123) 
Because a student must pass all of his or her attempted 
courses in order to be eligible for athletic participation, 
the Texas regulation has been given the name "no pass, no 
play". 
Although many states have had minimum academic 
standards for athletes for many years, the ' 80's have seen 
an upswing in increasing those requirements and creating 
requirements where none existed previously. In each of 
these cases the stated purpose for the creation of higher 
academic standards has been "to prevent extracurricular 
activities from interfering with academic instruction". 
(124) Like other issues, the creation of minimum academic 
standards for athletes has its supporters and its opponents. 
"Supporters of no pass, no play rules claim that the rules 
are a motivational tool, providing incentive for students to 
study harder. They see the rules as setting the right 
priorities - academics first, extracurricular activities 
second." (125) On the other hand, those who oppose the 
123 Texas Education Code, House Bill No. 72, Section 
21.920, also Section 21.921. 
124 Shelbey Crawford, Student participation In 
Extracurricular Activities, (Legislative Research), Salem, 
Oregon, 12. 
125 Martha Cromartie, "No Pass - No Play: Academic 
Requirements for Extracurricular Activities," School Law 
Bulletin 17 (Fall, 1986): 18. 
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academic rules are saying: "It is not only unfair, it is 
unjust to require of athletes that which is not required of 
other high school students." (126) Central to the arguments 
against having minimum academic standards for athletes is 
the one argument that athletics does so much for the 
athlete. (127) One assertation that has some support in 
research is that athletes and other students involved in 
extracurricular activities actually score higher on average 
in their classes than do those students who are not involved 
in some form of activities. (128) Soltz asserts further 
that neither do athletes' grades suffer during the time in 
which they are participating in an extracurricular activity, 
but rather a student athlete seems to score higher and fail 
fewer courses during the athletic season in which he or she 
is participating. (129) The other major objection or fear 
that is raised by the minimum academic requirements is that 
students who are on the academic borderline, and who are 
held in school by athletic participation, might become 
frustrated and drop out of school. (130) The summation of 
126 Thomas Harper, "Academic Eligibility Requirements 
for Student Athletes: Two Points of View. Minimum Academic 
Standards: No," NASSP Bulletin 70 (October 1986): 2. 
127 Ibid., 13. 
128 Donald F. Soltz, "Athletics and Academic 
Achievement: What Is the Relationship?," NASSP Journal 70 
(October, 1986): 20. 
129 Ibid., 23. 
130 Harper, 3. 
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all of these concerns seems to be, will the academic 
eligibility requirements as imposed by the state athletic 
associations and governing bodies accomplish the original 
stated purpose? (131) 
It is now possible to look at some of the early results 
and possibly see if there is an identifiable trend in the 
data produced. To gain insight into the future of academic 
requirement legislation, Texas House Bill 72 needs to be 
examined closely. What have been the results of the program 
to this point and has it accomplished what it set out to 
accomplish? "At the end of the first grading period to 
which the law applied, 15 per cent of all varsity athletes 
failed at least one course. For sub-varsity teams, the 
failure rate ran higher - 30 to 50 per cent. Statewide, 
more than 50 per cent of all students failed at least one 
course." (132) As a result, at least fifteen percent of 
student athletes in Texas were ruled ineligible for 
competition in interscholastic athletics. Will these 
students try harder and raise their grades, or will they 
lose interest in school and drop out? Two years after the 
implementation of House Bill 72 the state of Texas compiled 
results pertaining to education. According to that report; 
" results indicate that efforts to improve the educational 
131 Ibid., 1. 
132 Cromartie, 17. 
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system were well under way." (133) By the summer of 1987 
there was an even brighter outlook by the Texas Legislature. 
Percentages of ineligibility had begun to drop and the 
dropout rate had not increased. (134) 
Another result of the "no pass, no play" legislation is 
that it seems to affect minorities most. "For a six-week 
period in 1986, 35 per cent of blacks and 38 per cent of 
Hispanics failed, compared with 26 per cent for whites." 
(135) Thispattern has also started to lessen and the 
percentages for failure are beginning to align more closely. 
(136) 
It is yet to be seen what effect, if any, the courts 
will have on the new wave of academic requirements being 
placed on athletes. However, one might anticipate that the 
courts will follow the pattern that has been set with the 
early cases dealing with grades and athletic participation. 
Since amateur athletics are ordinarily conducted as a 
part of the educational activities of high schools and 
colleges, it is also common for there to be rules which 
limit eligibility to those who maintain a required 
grade average. Such a rule will ordinarily be a proper 
exercise of institutional authority, because it is 
133 Gibson D. (Gib) Lewis, Speaker, Texas House of 
Representatives, HB 72 Two years later (Austin: House 
Department of Reproductions, 1986), 1. 
134 Delco, interview. 
135 Cromartie, 17. 
136 Delco, interview. 
normally .both authorized and reasonable. (137) 
Early cases revealed that courts upheld the right of 
athletic associations to make and enforce rules dealing with 
academic eligibility. (138) Given this support by the 
courts and the encouragements of state legislators, states 
continue to increase academic requirements placed upon 
athletic eligibility. Effective at the beginning of the 
1988-89 school year, North Carolina will raise the number of 
required subjects passed from four to five per semester. 
(139) It could be expected that other states will follow. 
137 Weistart, Law of Sports, 68. 
138 Bailey v. Truby, 321 S.E.2d 302 (W.Va. 1984), and 
Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1985). 
In both of these cases the courts refused to recognize the 
right to participate as a property right that would be 
protected by the Constitution at either the state of Federal 
level. 
139 Letter received from Charlie Adams, Director of the 
North Carolina High School Athletic Association, (February, 
1988). 
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CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF CASES 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide the reader with a review of 
court cases pertinent to this study. The chapter has been 
organized by topic for clarification. Each topic has been 
divided into sub-topics that will present points of law 
which cases have in common. The material is further 
arranged chronologically to present and define any trends 
that have developed as these points of litigation evolved 
through the legal system for the time period covering 1972 
until 1988. 
This research involved a study of court cases in five 
specific areas: gender-based discrimination, discrimination 
against the handicapped, transfer regulations, age 
limitations, and academic eligibility. Each of these areas 
has been treated separately as topics to provide a clear 
review of court action pertaining to each subject. 
Court cases from state and federal courts were reviewed 
to give the reader a clear picture of the court action that 
has taken place regarding each topic. 
GENDER BASED DISCRIMINATION 
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A review of the court cases pertaining to gender based 
discrimination in secondary school athletics for the period 
1972 through 1988 indicates that these cases can be broken 
down into two major topic areas: [1] challenges to athletic 
association rules which are brought on behalf of 
individuals, and [2] challenges to regulations that charge 
unequal treatment of teams. Discrimination against 
individuals can then be further divided into discrimination 
against females and discrimination against males. 
Early in 1972, female athletes began to petition the 
courts seeking the opportunity to participate in sports 
programs that had been denied to them. (140) In Reed v. 
Nebraska School Activities Association, Debbie Reed sought 
an injunction that would allow her to participate on the 
Norfolk High School golf team. She had requested permission 
from her school to participate on the boy's golf team and 
had been denied on the basis that her participation on the 
team along with male members was a violation of the rules 
and regulations of the Nebraska School Activities 
Association. In this case, the school provided a golf team 
for males but did not provide a female student the 
opportunity to participate in competitive golf at the high 
school level. In evaluating the plaintiff's probability of 
140 Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Association, 341 
F.Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972) 
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success, Judge Urbom stated: 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States provides that no state shall "deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws." Is denial of an opportunity to try 
out for a place on a school golf team solely on the 
basis of sex a denial of equal protection of the laws? 
(141) 
Judge Urbom went further in his evaluation of the 
constitutional right of the female athlete to participate on 
male athletic teams. Court cases prior to this time had 
classified athletic participation as a privilege and not a 
right. (142) In addressing the issue of right and 
privilege, Judge Urbom stated: 
The issue is not whether Debbie Reed has a "right" to 
play golf; the issue is whether she can be treated 
differently from boys in an activity provided by the 
state. Her right is not the right to play golf. Her 
right is the right to be treated the same as boys 
unless there is a rational basis for her being treated 
differently. (143) 
Given the reasoning as stated, an injunction was issued that 
would allow Debbie Reed to participate on the Norfolk High 
School golf team. In reaching his decision, Judge Urbom had 
established two important points pertaining to female claims 
for equality in athletic opportunity. First, that failure 
to treat females equally was in violation of the fourteenth 
amendment, and secondly, that even though there was no right 
141 Ibid, at 261. 
142 Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association v. 
Cox, 425 S.W.2d 597 (Tenn. 1978) 
143 Reed v. Nebraska, 341 F.Supp. 258, 262 (D. Neb. 
1972) 
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to participate, there was a right to equal treatment. 
In November of the same year, Judge Hunter cited the 
reasoning of the court in Reed v. Nebraska when he found in 
favor of Johnell Haas in her petition seeking permission to 
participate on the male golf team of her school. (144) 
In January of 1973, the courts upheld the right of the 
female athlete to have equal opportunity to participate when 
Judge Edwards upheld an injunction allowing Cynthia Morris 
to participate on iae boys '  tennis z*? -145) Judge 
Edwards did, however, say that the injunction allowing 
females to participate with males on athletic teams should 
be limited to that of non-contact sports. (146) 
In April 1973, Judge Heaney, writing for the United 
States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, upheld the right of 
the female athlete to participate on male teams when non-
contact sports were involved. (147) Two girls, Peggy 
Brenden and Antoinette St. Pierre, sought relief from the 
Minnesota State High School League rule which stated: 
Girls shall be prohibited from participation in the 
boys1 interscholastic athletic program either as member 
of the boys' team or a member of the girls' team 
playing the boys' team. The girls' team shall not 
144 Haas v. South Bend Community School Corporation, 
289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972) 
145 Morris v. Michigan State Board of Education, 472 
F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973) 
146 Ibid, at 1209. 
147 Brenden v. Independent School District 742, 342 
P.Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1972), 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973) 
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accept male members. (148) 
In Brenden, as in former cases, the point of litigation was 
that this rule of the Minnesota athletic association was in 
violation of the equal protection rights of the fourteenth 
amendment. In the opinion of the court, there was one 
question that had to be answered. 
The question in this case is not whether the plaintiffs 
have an absolute right to participate in 
interscholastic athletics, but whether the plaintiffs 
can be denied the benefits of activities provided by 
the state for male students. (149) 
The decision of the court in Brenden was nothing new, nor 
was the reasoning new. However, the decision did serve to 
reinforce the direction of the courts in Reed, Haas, and 
Morris. From this point on, Brenden became the case to be 
cited when dealing with the rights of female athletes to 
participate on male teams. 
In 1974, Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities 
Association, saw the rights of the female athlete upheld 
again but with one specific addition. (150) In Gilpin, the 
court awarded Tammie Gilpin not only the right to 
participate but also lawyer fees. The athletic association 
was also required to pay the cost of court. (151) 
148 Brenden v. Independent School District 742, 477 
F.2d 1202, 1294 (8th Cir. 1973) 
149 Ibid, at 1297. 
150 Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities 
Association, 377 F.Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1974) 
151 Ibid, at 1253. 
Until 1975, the question facing the courts had been 
boys and girls participating in non-contact sports and was 
consistently decided in favor of the female athlete. In 
September of 1975, the courts were faced with yet another 
variable. Delores and Carol Darrin were high school 
students who wanted to participate on the school's football 
team. (152) The high school coach gave them the right to 
try out for the team. The girls met all of the 
requirements, passed all of the physical examinations, and 
met the required number of practices of the Washington 
Interscholastic Activities Association. However, there was 
a rule of the association that prohibited girls from 
participating with boys on contact athletic teams. The 
court ruled in favor of the girls and granted them the right 
to participate on the previously all male athletic team 
involving contact sports. With this decision the courts had 
opened the area of contact sports to female participation. 
(153) 
Darrin and Carnes had breached the subject and opened 
up contact sports to female athletes. In 1977, a case out 
of Colorado would be decided and become the standard for 
female participation in athletics at the secondary level. 
152 Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975) 
153 See also, Carnes v. Tennessee Secondary School 
Athletic Association, 415 F.Supp. 569 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) 
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(154) In Hoover v. Meiklejohn, the court was faced with an 
old problem but came up with a new solution. In the past, 
athletic association rules had been voided and females had 
been given the right to participate in contact sports. In 
Hoover, the court decision presented the school with three 
acceptable options, any of which would satisfy the court and 
fulfill the schools' obligation to the female athlete. 
They may decide to discontinue soccer as an 
interscholastic athletic activity; they may decide to 
field separate teams for males and females, with 
substantial equality in funding, coaching, officiating 
and opportunity to play; or they may decide to permit 
both sexes to compete on the same team. (155) 
The position of the court in Hoover solidified the position 
of the female athlete in secondary school athletics and 
became the case of reference when dealing with female 
eligibility. (156) 
In some noncontact sports, state athletic associations 
had established separate teams prior to Hoover. The first 
challenge to the separate team concept surfaced in Ritacco 
154 Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F.Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 
1977) 
155 Ibid, at 172. 
156 See also, Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic 
Athletic Association, 444 F.Supp. 1117 (E.D. Wis. 1978), 
Clinton v. Nagy, 411 F.Supp 1396 (N.D. Ohio 1974), Lantz by 
Lantz v. Ambach, 620 F.Supp. 663 (D.C.N.Y. 1985), and Force 
by Force v. Pierce City R-VI School District, 570 F.Supp. 
1020 (W.D. Mo. 1983). All of these cases addressed the 
issue of female discrimination based on the fourteenth 
amendment and found in favor of the female athlete. 
v. Norwin ScHool District. (157) Elizabeth Ritacco was a 
member of the girls' tennis team. She wanted to try out for 
the boys' team also but was prohibited from doing so by a 
rule of the Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic 
Association which prohibited the mixing of males and females 
on sports teams. Judge Gourley, in writing the opinion of 
the court, upheld the right of the athletic association to 
establish separate teams where there is a rational basis for 
the rule. (158) The establishment of the "separate but 
equal" concept of fielding female sports teams was created 
by the courts in Hoover, but did not end the challenges 
directed at the concept. (159) However, the court in 
O'Connor v. Board of Education of School District 23 
continued to uphold the concept of "separate but equal" to 
be constitutional when applied to female athletic programs. 
To this point the cases reviewed have dealt with a 
charge of sex discrimination based on the assumption that 
any form of discrimination was in violation of the 
fourteenth amendment. Those cases were very successful for 
female litigants. In 1981, the first cases began to surface 
charging sexual discrimination based on the ground that 
failure to allow a female the opportunity to participate on 
157 Ritacco v. Norwin School District, 361 F.Supp. 930 
(W.D. Penn. 1973) 
158 Ibid, at 930. 
159 O'Connor v. Board of Education of School District 
23, 545 F.Supp. 376 (N.D. 111. 1982) 
a male athletic team was a violation of the rights 
guaranteed to the female by Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972. (160) In Othen v. Ann Arbor School 
Board, Pamela Othen was "cut" from the golf team of Pioneer 
High School. Pamela charged that she had been removed from 
the golf team solely on the basis of her sex, and that the 
removal constituted a violation of the Title IX legislation 
because the school system was receiving some federal impact 
aid money. (161) The interpretation of program became the 
central factor in this case. 
The heart of the defendant's theory is that the 
requirements of Title IX are programmatic in nature and 
impose statutory obligations as to only those specific 
programs or activities which receive direct federal 
financial assistance. 
The plaintiff's theory is predicated on the contention 
that Title IX applies to any program or activity of any 
institution which receives federal financial 
assistance, regardless of whether or not the particular 
program under attack receives direct federal funding. 
(162) 
The court reached its decision that Title IX was to be 
defined as program specific and that it would extend only to 
those programs which were receiving federal assistance. The 
court further held that Pioneer High School was not required 
to allow Pamela to participate on the golf team for males 
nor were they required to create a separate golf team for 
160 Othen v. Ann Arbor School Board, 507 F.Supp. 1376 
(E.D. Mich. 1981) 
161 Ibid, at 1377. 
162 Ibid, at 1380. 
females. (163)- It is interesting to note that Pioneer High 
School had already established a female team prior to the 
court rendering its decision. However, the court continued 
with the legal process and defined the scope of Title IX as 
it pertained to secondary school athletics. 
Litigants have found it hard to prevail when basing 
their charges of discrimination upon the violation of Title 
IX legislation. (164) There have been cases where Title IX 
was a part of the plaintiff's claim and the court found in 
favor of the plaintiff. (165) However, in Force v. Pierce 
City and in Lantz v. Ambach, the case was decided because of 
the inclusion of the charge that the athletic association 
regulations were in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 
In addressing the Title IX claim, each court found that in 
order to come under the control of Title IX the athletic 
program would have to be receiving federal funds and that at 
best Title IX, as it applied to each case was neutral. (166) 
Because of the precedent set by the court in Othen v. Ann 
Arbor, no female has prevailed when using Title IX as the 
163 Ibid, at 1390. 
164 See also, Yellow Springs Exempted Village School 
District Board of Education v. Ohio High School Athletic 
Association, 647 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1981) 
165 Force by Force v. Pierce City R-VI School District, 
570 F.Supp. 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1983), and Lantz by Lantz v. 
Ambach, 620 F.Supp. 663 (D.C.N.Y. 1985) 
166 Lantz by Lantz v. Ambach, 620 F.Supp. 663, 665 
(D.C.N.Y. 1985) 
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basis for litigation. Based upon the contents of the Civil 
Rights Restoration Act, which was passed over President 
Reagan's veto, on the 22nd of March, 1988, these court 
decisions seem in jeopardy. (167) This bill in part 
provides: "compliance is required throughout entire 
colleges, universities and public school systems if any 
/• 
program or activity receives federal aid." (168) The 
provisions of this legislation will invalidate the decisions 
of the courts in the cases dealing with Title IX 
legislation. 
With the success of females seeking the opportunity to 
participate on male athletic teams came the charges of 
reverse discrimination and litigation instituted by males 
seeking the opportunity to participate on previously all 
female teams. In 1979 the first of such cases came to the 
courts for a ruling. (169) In Gomes v. Rhode Island 
Interscholastic League, the courts were faced with the issue 
of a male charging sex discrimination because he had been 
denied the opportunity to participate on the all-female 
volleyball team sponsored by Rogers High School where he was 
a student. Gomes had tried out for the team and had been 
selected by the coach as one of the team's members. He had 
167 "Reagan Veto of Civil Rights Bill Toppled," The 
Asheville Citizen, 23 March 1988, sec. A, p. 1. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 
F.Supp. 659 (D. Rhode Island 1979) 
continued to practice even though he had not been allowed to 
participate solely because of his sex. He went to the 
courts seeking an injunction which would allow him to 
participate on the volleyball team. The case was argued 
around one specific point of Title IX. Part of the Title IX 
legislation states: 
...where a recipient operates or sponsors a team in a 
particular sport for members of one sex but operates or 
sponsors no such team for members of the other sex, and 
athletic opportunities for members of that sex have 
previously been limited, members of the excluded sex 
must be allowed to try-out for the team offered unless 
the sport involved is a contact sport. (170) 
Within this statement came the point of contention. The two 
sides disagreed with the interpretation of "and athletic 
opportunities for members of that sex have previously been 
limited." The position of the plaintiff was that the 
interpretation of the phrase must be in regard to the 
particular sport and team in question. Given that 
interpretation, males had been limited in their 
opportunities to participate in volleyball at Rogers High 
and would, therefore, be covered by the Title IX 
legislation. The defendants argued that it was necessary to 
interpret the phrase in a general sense and apply it to all 
athletic participation rather than one sport. Since Rogers 
High school continued to sponsor male teams in other sports, 
this would mean that Gomes had not been discriminated 
against when he was denied the opportunity to participate on 
170 Ibid, at 663. 
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the girls' volleyball team. (171) In the opinion of the 
court, Judge Pettine wrote that, Donald Gomes had been 
discriminated against and the court issued an injunction 
which would allow Gomes to participate on the female 
volleyball team. In his closing statements Judge Pettine 
wrote: 
Separate but equal volleyball teams do appear the most 
advantageous athletic approach. But whether such teams 
are created at Rogers High School can only be decided 
by the school administrators, the coaches, and, 
ultimately the political process. (172) 
This ruling meant that Title IX protected against sex 
discrimination in either form, whether it be directed at 
females or males. The case was appealed and subsequently 
declared moot by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 
(173) 
The next case to come before the court dealing with 
discrimination against males went counter to the decision 
reached in Gomes. (174) In Petrie v. Illinois High School 
Association, the facts presented to the court were almost 
identical to the information presented in Gomes. However, 
the court failed to grant the injunction requested. In 
relating the court's opinion, Judge Green stated: 
171 Ibid, at 664. 
172 Ibid, at 666. 
173 Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 604 
F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979) 
174 Petrie v Illinois High School Association, 394 
N.E.2d 855 (111. 1979) 
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We have no trouble in concluding that having a separate 
volleyball team and separate tournaments in that sport 
for girls is substantially related to and serves the 
achievement of the important governmental objective of 
maintaining, fostering and promoting athletic 
opportunities for girls. It, therefore, satisfies the 
due process requirement of the fourteenth amendment. 
(175) 
The decision in Petrie was based on the fact that the 
creation of athletic teams for females and disallowing males 
to participate on those teams was a permissible means of 
attempting to promote, equality of opportunity for female 
athletes. (176) 
Claims charging discrimination against individuals is 
not the only type of litigation to face the courts. There 
have also been charges of unequal treatment for teams. (177) 
In Bucha v. Illinois High School Association, the plaintiffs 
were two female students at Hinsdale Center Township High 
School. Part of the original challenge came as a result of 
a rule of the Illinois High School Association (IHSA) which 
prohibited female participation in interscholastic swimming 
competition. Before the case came to court, this rule was 
amended and allowed for the creation of female swim teams 
complete with scheduled swim meets sanctioned by IHSA. The 
175 Ibid, at 862. 
176 See also, Clark, Etc. v. Arizona Interscholastic 
Association, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982), and Forte v. 
Board of Education, North Babylon Etc., 431 N.Y.S.2d 321 
(1980) . 
177 Bucha v. Illinois High School Association, 351 
F.Supp. 69 (N.D. 111. 1972) 
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second part of the challenge remained for the courts to 
decide. The complaint was that there were limitations and 
restrictions placed on the female teams that were not placed 
on the male teams. (178) Clearly this was not a challenge 
that dealt with the total absence of a girls' athletic 
program. 
What is questioned is a matter of degree and 
professional judgment, that is, given the 
uncontroverted existence of a statewide athletics 
program open to all girls, plaintiffs assert that the 
decision of Illinois' physical education to conduct 
separate athletic contests for the sexes and to provide 
a different program for each sex is not rationally 
related to the overall educational objectives in 
sponsoring sporting events. (179) 
The plaintiffs failed in their attempts to convince the 
court and the finding was in favor of the Illinois High 
School Association. The court further held that, in its 
opinion, the reasons provided by the athletic association 
for having separate rules for girls and boys were 
sufficient. (180) The judgment upheld the right of athletic 
associations to create and enforce rules for females that 
178 The restrictions applicable only to girls include a 
prohibition on organized cheering, a one dollar limitation 
on the value of awards, and a prohibition on overnight trips 
in conjunction with girls' contests. Bucha v. Illinois, at 
71. 
179 Bucha v. Illinois, at 74. 
180 Testimony presented to the court by women coaches 
and other female athletes expressed fear that unrestricted 
athletic competition between the sexes would result in a 
male dominated athletic program state wide. And that this 
could decrease female participation and possibly even do 
away with it entirely. 
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were not consistent with the rules for boys in the same 
sport. 
In 1976 a case came before the courts that challenged 
the legality of separate rules for girls' and boys' 
basketball. (181) In Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School 
Athletic Association, the plaintiff, Victoria Ann Cape, a 
junior female student at Oak Ridge High School, claimed that 
the State of Tennessee had denied her the right of equal 
protection guaranteed to her by the fourteenth amendment. 
The basis of plaintiff's claim is that the rules for 
girls' basketball, promulgated and enforced by the 
defendants, are different from those applied to boys' 
basketball and that the application of different rules 
to girls' basketball is a deprivation of her right to 
equal protection of the law, i.e., it is an arbitrary, 
capricious, and unreasonable distinction. (182) 
Cape's argument centered around her belief that because of 
the fact that she was a guard on the school team, and that 
according to the rules for girls' basketball in Tennessee, 
she was limited to the defensive end of the floor, that she 
would not be able to develop her offensive skills and would 
therefore not be likely to earn a scholarship to play 
basketball in college. Because the rules for the state of 
Tennessee were different for girls' and boys' basketball, 
she felt that she was being denied equal opportunity and 
that those rules were violative of the Constitution, 
181 Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic 
Association, 424 F.Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) 
182 Ibid, at 735. 
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specifically the fourteenth amendment. In deciding in favor 
of the plaintiff, Judge Taylor wrote: 
It is ordered that the rules applicable to girls' 
basketball which impose half-court, six-player 
restrictions and which permit only forwards to shoot, 
be, and the same hereby are, declared to be in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
(183) 
The Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association appealed 
the decision and the case was decided in October of 1977. 
(184) After review, the appeals court reversed the decision 
and remanded it for entry of judgment for defendants. The 
appeals court did not agree with the lower court that the 
separate set of rules for girls' basketball was a violation 
of the fourteenth amendment. In reaching its decision, the 
court saw no evidence of any intent on the part of the 
athletic association to discriminate against the female 
athletes of the state. The rules of the athletic 
association had been upheld. 
In 1979 the same question came before the courts again. 
(185) However, in Dodson v. Arkansas Activities 
Association, the results were different. Like the federal 
district court in Cape v. Tennessee, the district court here 
found in favor of the female student and required the 
183 Ibid, at 744. 
184 Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic 
Association, 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977) 
185 Dodson v. Arkansas Activities Association, 468 
F.Supp. 394 (E.D. Ark. 1979) 
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Arkansas Activities Association to make the rules for girls' 
basketball the same as the rules for boys' basketball. In 
Cape and Dodson, the facts were the same and the requests 
for relief were based on the same claim that the rules were 
violative of the equal protection rights of the fourteenth 
amendment. However, the court here looked at whether there 
was legitimate justification for having two sets of rules 
and found that there was little or no justification. The 
case was decided in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant 
athletic association was required to change its rules. 
In 1982, the practice of having separate seasons for 
such sports as tennis and swimming came under attack. (186) 
In Striebel v. Minnesota State High School League, the point 
in question was whether it was legal for the state athletic 
association to establish and operate two separate seasons 
for sports like tennis and swimming when the determining 
factor for the division was sex. The court held that it was 
an acceptable scheduling decision for the state athletic 
association when the reasons were as presented, lack of 
facilities, and the seasons were neither substantially 
better than the other. In dealing with separate seasons, 
the court upheld the right of the athletic associations to 
make and enforce the rules governing seasons of 
participation. 
186 Striebel v. Minnesota State High School League, 321 
N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1982) 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE HANDICAPPED 
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A review of the court cases pertaining to handicapped 
discrimination in secondary school athletics for the period 
1972 through 1988 reveals that the topic can be divided into 
two major classifications: [1] students with physical 
handicaps and [2] students with emotional or mental 
handicaps. This division is in keeping with the definition 
of a handicapped person outlined in The Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973. The act defines a handicapped person as follows: 
Any person who (a) has a physical or mental impairment 
which substantially limits one or more of such person's 
major life activities, (b) has a record of such an 
impairment, or (c) is regarded as having such an 
impairment. (187) 
Court cases in this section will be treated according to 
this two-part division. 
In 1972, Joseph Spitaleri was medically disqualified 
from participating in football at Levittown Memorial High 
School. (188) Spitaleri1s appeal to the Commissioner of 
Education was refused and he initiated court action seeking 
permission to participate in football. Spitaleri's medical 
condition, which had rendered him ineligible, stemmed from 
an injury that he had sustained to his left eye when he was 
six years old. The accident, for all practical purposes, 
had left him blind in his left eye. Using the criteria of 
187 Statutes at Large, PL 92-318. 
188 Spitaleri v Nyquist, 345 N.Y.S.2d 878 (N.Y. 1973) 
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the American • Medical Association reported in a pamphlet 
entitled "A Guide for Medical Evaluation for Candidates for 
School Sports", the examining physician in the school 
district ruled Spitaleri ineligible for competition in 
football. The AMA guidelines listed the absence of one of 
the paired organs as a reason for declaring a student 
ineligible. In Spitaleri's case, the loss of vision in the 
left eye was sufficient to have him declared ineligible. 
The parents offered to assume any risk of injury that might 
be incurred through their son's involvement on the football 
team. They offered to enter into an agreement to protect 
the school board from any suit that might result from injury 
to their son. (189) 
According to New York State law, the decision of the 
Commissioner of Education could not be overturned by the 
courts unless the decision was proven to be "purely 
arbitrary". (190) 
In the mind of the court, the decision of the 
Commissioner of Education was neither arbitrary nor 
capricious, and the decision to prevent Spitaleri from 
participating in football was in the best interest of the 
student himself. 
As a result of the Spitaleri case, the New York 
Legislature made an attempt to change what it considered to 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid., at 879. 
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be an injustice. The result of the legislature's effort was 
Senate Bill 1440 which was to become known as the "Spitaleri 
Bill". (191) This bill made it possible for the courts to 
look at petitions from the parents and affidavits from two 
licensed physicians, and to make a decision as to which 
would be in the best interest of the student. (192) This 
bill gave the courts some flexibility in making future 
decisions. 
In the case of John Colombo, Jr., a student with a loss 
of hearing in one ear and a partial loss in the other ear, 
the New York courts continued the course that had been set 
in the Spitaleri case. (193) Colombo was ruled to be 
medically ineligible to participate in football. 
In September, the first case to invoke section 4409 of 
the Education Law came to the courts of New York. (194) Kim 
Swiderski had a partial loss of sight in her right eye 
caused by a congenital cataract and an underdeveloped optic 
nerve. She had been denied participation in athletics at 
her school and sought an order from the court allowing her 
to participate under the guidelines of section 4409. Kim's 
parents had provided for the court the necessary material 
191 Appenzeller, The Right to participate, 156. 
192 Ibid., at 157. 
193 Colombo v Sewanhaka Central High School, Etc., 383 
N.Y.S.2d 518 (N.Y. 1976) 
194 Swiderski v. Board of Education-City School 
District of Albany, 408 N.Y.S.2d 744 (N.Y. 1978) 
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called for in section 4409, that being two affidavits from 
licensed physicians and a signed statement from the parents. 
The affidavits included a statement that Kim could 
participate safely if she were to wear protective goggles 
during practice and athletic events. Judge Conway, after 
reviewing all evidence presented to the court, ruled that it 
would be safe for Kim to participate and that it would be in 
the best interest of the student. Also, in accordance with 
section 4409, the order relieved the school and school 
district from any responsibility if Kim were to be injured 
while taking part in the athletic program. (195) The 
next case brought to the courts seeking an order under 
section 4409 was not greeted with the same results. (196) 
In Kampmeier v. Harris, the information before the court was 
much the same as that in Swiderski. Margaret Kampmeier had 
a visual handicap. She presented to the court a statement 
from her parents, and two affidavits from licensed 
physicians which stated that she could participate safely 
with protective goggles. Section 4409 of the Education Law 
provided that not only must the student be reasonably safe, 
but the court must decide if it were in the best interest of 
the student to participate. It is with this last part that 
the court had problems. Margaret Kampmeier had not been 
identified by the school as a handicapped student. 
195 Ibid., at 745. 
196 Kampmeier v. Harris, 403 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. 1978) 
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Therefore, not being identified as handicapped, she was not 
entitled to treatment as a handicapped student. 
...the court finds that judgment under Education Law 
section 4409 would not be in the best interest of the 
student under these circumstances. (197) 
Given that information, the relief sought by the plaintiff 
was denied. On appeal, the Supreme Court, Appellate 
/• 
Division, ruled that the lower court had used information in 
making its decision that should not have been considered in 
determining what would be in the best interest of the 
student. (198) The order of the lower court was reversed 
and the petition was granted which allowed Margaret 
Kampmeier to participate in athletics. 
It was not until 1980 that handicapped students came to 
the courts charging violations of their rights guaranteed to 
them under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
Poole v. South Plainfield Board of Education was one of the 
first cases to consider litigation based upon this 
legislation. (199) Richard Poole was born with one kidney. 
Because of this congenital handicap and the AMA guidelines 
that recommended against the participation in athletics of 
students with a missing paired organ, he was denied the 
right to participate on the school's wrestling team. Poole 
197 Ibid., at 641. 
198 Kampmeier v. Harris, 411 N.Y.S.2d 744 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. App. Div. 1978) 
199 Poole v. South Plainfield Board of Education, 490 
F.Supp. 948 (D. N.J. 1980) 
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brought action against the board of education seeking the 
right to participate in athletics. By the time the case 
came to court, Poole had graduated from South Plainfield 
High School. The court agreed to hear the case and made the 
determination that if Poole could prove that he was a victim 
that he should be entitled to some type of relief. (200) 
The South Plainfield School System was a recipient of 
federal funding and as such was subject to the regulation of 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. In hearing 
the case, the court recognized that its decision hinged on 
one factor, whether or not a handicapped person was 
otherwise qualified. According to the language of section 
504, "an otherwise qualified person is one who is able to 
meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his 
handicap". (201) 
The question to be decided in this case, then, is 
whether Richard Poole Jr., was able to meet all of 
South Plainfield's interscholastic wrestling program's 
requirements in spite of the fact that he was born with 
one kidney. (202) 
In the opinion of the court, the board of education had 
overstepped its bounds and had acted in place of the parents 
when it should have provided the parents with all pertinent 
information to see that the parents did not act in a foolish 
manner. In its decision, the court gave a vivid definition 
200 Ibid., at 949. 
201 Ibid., at 953. 
202 Ibid. 
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of the purpose of section 504. 
Life has risks. The purpose of section 504, however, 
is to permit handicapped individuals to live life as 
fully as they are able, without paternalistic 
authorities deciding that certain activities are too 
risky for them. (203) 
The case was decided in favor of the plaintiff. The court 
in Poole had established a precedent that would be followed 
by another court in dealing with the right of a handicapped 
person to participate in athletics. (204) The combined 
effect of these two cases tended to minimize the influence 
of the guidelines the AMA had issued pertaining to 
eligibility of the handicapped. 
Another area the courts were forced to deal with 
regarding the handicapped student's right to participate 
involved the mentally or emotionally handicapped athlete. 
In 1978, an emotionally handicapped student challenged a 
transfer regulation in the state of Texas. (205) As early 
as 1976 John Doe had begun showing signs of emotional 
illness. In 1977, Doe's father was diagnosed as having 
terminal cancer. This seemed to set off a series of violent 
outbursts which culminated with John's being hospitalized 
after the Christmas holidays of 1977. In March of 1978, 
John became violent during an argument with his parents and 
203 Ibid., at 953-954. 
204 Grube v. Bethlehem Area School District, 550 
F.Supp. 418 (E.D. Penn. 1982) 
205 Doe v. Marshall, 459 F.Supp. 1190 (S.D. Tex 1978) 
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threatened them with a loaded shotgun. He was again 
hospitalized and given treatment for what was diagnosed to 
be an adolescent adjustment reaction. Upon the 
recommendation of his therapist, the court removed him from 
the home and placed him with his maternal grandmother. This 
necessitated a transfer from the Friendswood School District 
to the Alvin High School District. The Texas University 
Interscholastic League (UIL) declared John Doe ineligible to 
participate on the Alvin football team based upon the 
following rule: 
a. A student changing schools whose parents or 
guardians do not reside in the school district is 
ineligible for varsity contests; b. a student living 
with a guardian is eligible only if the guardianship is 
of one year's standing; and c. where both parents are 
still alive, the University Interscholastic League will 
not acknowledge the existence of a legal guardianship. 
(206) 
Jane Doe, on behalf of her son, John Doe, brought action 
seeking an injunction which would allow her son to 
participate in football on the Alvin High School team during 
his senior year. The court found a major flaw in the 
UIL regulation. 
There is apparently no structure within the 
organizational scheme of the UIL which provides a 
mechanism by which special and individual cases, such 
as John Doe's, may be given special and individual 
handling. (207) 
The court also considered the harm that would come to the 
206 Ibid., at 1194. 
207 Ibid., at 1191. 
plaintiff if the injunction were not granted and the harm 
that would come to UIL if the injunction were granted. The 
court found that the amount of harm that might be inflicted 
on John Doe if the injunction were not granted far 
outweighed the amount of harm that UIL would incur by 
granting the injunction. For these reasons, the injunction 
was granted and John Doe was given the right to participate 
on the Alvin High School football team in his senior year. 
Another case dealing with a neurologically handicapped 
child seeking to participate on the high school wrestling 
team ended with negative rather than positive results. (208) 
In Cavallaro v. Ambach, the plaintiff had been detained in 
the ninth grade. By the time he was a senior in high 
school, he was nineteen years of age and too old to 
participate in athletics. He had also used up the four 
years of eligibility that is granted to each student by the 
New York State Public High School Athletic Association. An 
appeal was made to the state association by the local school 
superintendent seeking permission to extend the eligibility 
of Cavallaro. The appeal was denied and injunctive action 
was sought through the courts. In looking at the potential 
damage to the plaintiff and the defendant association, the 
court found that: 
...the potential hardship to Daniel if the injunction 
does not issue fails to outweigh the more substantial 
208 Cavallaro by Cavallaro v. Ambach, 575 F.Supp. 171 
(W-D. N.Y. 1983) 
84 
probability of hardships created by possible injuries 
to younger wrestlers caused by their competition with a 
physically mature 19 year old. (209) 
As a result of the plaintiff's failing to prove the 
substantial burden necessary, the injunction was denied and 
Daniel Cavallaro was declared ineligible to participate 
during his senior year. 
TRANSFER REGULATIONS 
A review of the court cases involving students who had 
been declared ineligible to participate in secondary school 
athletics because of state athletic association transfer 
rules reveals a division into four specific categories: [1] 
schools that were punished for violation of transfer 
regulations, [2] students claiming that state regulation 
restricts freedom of travel, [3] nonresident students 
wishing to participate in a state where they did not reside, 
and [4] students seeking constitutional protection from 
athletic association regulations. Cases in each of these 
areas will be reviewed by topic and in a chronological 
order. 
On October 20, 1972, the varsity football teams from 
Medford High School and Grant Pass High School played each 
209 Ibid., at 175. 
other. (210) Grant Pass High School won the game. As a 
result of the victory, Grant Pass was declared the 
conference champion. On October 24, 1972, Medford High 
School filed a protest stating that one of the students on 
the Grant Pass team was ineligible to participate due to an 
infraction of the transfer regulation of the Oregon School 
Activity Association (OSAA). The OSAA reviewed the charge 
and concluded that in fact Jack Peters was ineligible to 
participate. As a result of Jack's being ineligible, Grant 
Pass was ordered to forfeit all of the games in which Jack 
Peters had participated. As a result of this action, 
Medford High School became the conference champion. The 
Multnomah County Circuit Court restored the winning school 
as the conference champion twenty-four hours before the 
first round state playoff game. Grant Pass participated in 
the game as the conference champion and lost. On appeal, 
the court of appeals first decided that the issue was not 
moot simply because the playoff game had already taken 
place; second, that the lower court had erred in reversing 
the decision of the athletic association; third, the rule of 
the association was overbroad and the association did not 
act arbitrarily in hearing the losing school's protest. 
(211) The decision of the lower court was reversed. Jack 
210 Josephine City School District No. 7 v. Orgon 
School Activities Association, 515 P.2d 431 (Or. App. 1973) 
211 Ibid., at 432. 
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Peters was declared ineligible, and Grant Pass High School 
forfeited its claim to the conference championship. The use 
of a student who was in violation of the transfer rules of 
the state association had cost the school its conference 
championship. His ineligibility had resulted in the school 
being ruled ineligible. 
Two students have brought charges against athletic 
associations' transfer rules claiming that said rules placed 
an unconstitutional burden on their right to travel. (212) 
In Sturrup v. Mahan, Warren B. Sturrup had lived in Miami, 
Florida and had attended school there during the 1971-72 
school year. During the summer of 1971, Warren had moved to 
Bloomington, Indiana, and had taken up residence with his 
brother. Warren had left Miami because of conditions in the 
home that were described as being "demoralizing and 
detrimental" in nature. Warren, along with other students, 
was involved in drugs. Warren enrolled in University 
Junior-Senior High School that fall and sought the right to 
participate on the school's football team. After 
corresponding with the Indiana High School Athletic 
Association (IHSAA), Robert M. Mahan, principal of 
University High School, informed Warren that he was 
ineligible to participate in football because of the 
212 Sturrup v. Mahan, 290 N.E.2d 64 (App. Ct. Ind. 
1972), 305 N.E.2d 877 (Sup. Ct. Ind. 1974), and Sullivan v. 
University Interscholastic League, 599 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1980), 616 S.W.2d 170 (Sup. Ct. Tex. 1981). 
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transfer rule of the IHSAA. Warren Sturrup sought a 
preliminary injunction to allow him to participate. The 
trial court denied the injunction. Sturrup appealed and the 
court of appeals reversed the decision. (213) The basis of 
the appeal court's decision was two-fold. First, the court 
found that the IHSAA transfer rule violated Warren's right 
to travel, and second, that the rule, as applied, was 
violative of his rights guaranteed under the fourteenth 
amendment. The Supreme Court of Indiana heard the case in 
order to correct an error in the opinion of the court of 
appeals. (214) Here the court upheld the decision of the 
court of appeals but for reasons other than stated in the 
lower court decision. The supreme court in reversing part 
of the decision stated: 
...plaintiff was not denied equal protection on theory 
that the bylaws unconstitutionally burdened his right 
to travel among the states; but that such bylaws 
violated equal protection by reason of being 
unreasonably broad, in excluding from eligibility many 
students who move for reasons unrelated to athletics: 
and that denial of eligibility to plaintiff, who moved 
to avoid demoralizing and detrimental conditions of his 
home and school environment in Florida and whose adult 
brother in Indiana was appointed his legal guardian, 
was arbitrary and capricious. (215) 
The plaintiff had won his appeal but not because his right 
213 Sturrup v. Mahan, 290 N.E.2d 64 (App. Ct. Ind. 1972) 
214 Sturrup v. Mahan, 305 N.E.2d 877 (Sup. Ct. Ind. 
1974) 
215 Ibid., at 877. 
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to travel between states had been denied. (216) 
In 1980, a similar case came to the courts in Texas. 
(217) In Sullivan v. University Interscholastic League, 
John Sullivan had moved with his father from Vermont to 
Austin, Texas. The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas upheld 
the ruling of the trial court when it decided that the rule 
did not violate the equal protection clause by infringing on 
the rights of the student to interstate travel. The supreme 
court in hearing the case on appeal ruled that the UIL rule 
did, in fact, violate the equal protection clause and 
reversed the decision and granted injunction sought. (218) 
In each case, the student had eventually won the right 
to participate but for different reasons and with 
contradicting conclusions. One court said that such 
transfer rules did violate the equal protection clause of 
the Constitution which guarantees the right to travel 
between the states, and the other court said that they did 
not. 
The largest body of legal action comes from the area of 
students petitioning the courts for injunctive relief 
charging that they have a right to participate in athletics 
216 See also, Niles v. University Interscholastic 
League, 715 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1983) 
217 Sullivan v. University Interscholastic League, 599 
S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) 
218 Sullivan v. University Interscholastic League, 616 
S.W.2d 170 (Sup. Ct. Tex. 1981) 
89 
and violations of due process. In 1975, a fifteen year old 
student by the name of George Dallam transferred from Camp 
Hill School District to the Cumberland Valley School 
District. (219) Dallam was deemed ineligible to participate 
in interscholastic athletics for the period of one year in 
accordance with the transfer rule of the Pennsylvania 
Interscholastic Athletic Association (PIAA). Dallam sought 
a permanent injunction which would allow him to participate. 
In presenting his case the plaintiff argued: 
...that the automatic ineligibility rule acts as an 
irrebuttable presumption in violation of his equal 
protection and due process rights guaranteed under the 
United States Constitution. (220) 
In its decision, the court stated that there was no 
constitutionally protected property interest in competing 
for a position on the school athletic team. The plaintiff 
has access to all physical exercise and can participate in 
athletic competition with members of his own school. He is 
simply prohibited from competing against teams from other 
schools as a member of the school team. 
In cases similar to this one the courts continued to 
uphold the right of the athletic association to make and 
enforce rules and continued to reject the idea that 
participation in athletics was a property right granted by 
219 Dallam v. Cumberland Valley School District, 391 
F.Supp. 358 (M.D. Penn. 1975) 
220 Ibid., at 359. 
the constitution. (221) 
Not all transfer cases were decided in favor of 
athletic associations and against students. In those cases 
where the student won the injunction sought, there were 
always unusual circumstances. In Kentucky High School 
Athletic Association v. Jackson, the appeals court of 
Kentucky upheld the lower court's decision to grant Kevin 
Jackson an injunction that would allow him to participate in 
basketball. (222) Kevin's parents were divorced in 
September of 1976. Upon agreement of both parents, Kevin's 
mother was to have custody of both Kevin and his younger 
sister. At the time of separation the mother moved into the 
city limits of Williamsburg. Instead of changing the two 
221 See also, Bruce v. South Carolina High School 
League, 189 S.E.2d 817 (Supp. Ct. S.C. 1972),Albach v. Odle, 
531 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1976), Hamilton v. Tennessee 
Secondary School Athletic Association, 552 F.2d 681 (6th 
Cir. 1976), Kentucky High School Athletic Association v. 
Hopkins County Board of Education, 552 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. App. 
1977), Crandall v. North Dakota High School Activities 
Association, 261 N.W.2d 921 (Sup. Ct. N.D. 1978),Monzingo v. 
Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Association, 575 P.2d 
1379 (App. Ct. Okl. 1978),Kulovitz v. Illinois High School 
Association, 462 F.Supp. 875 (N.D. 111. 1978), Kriss v. 
Brown, 390 N.E.2d 193 (App. Ct. Ind. 1979), Walsh v. 
Louisiana High School Athletic Association, 616 F.2d 152 
(5th Cir. 1980), Herbert v. Ventetuolo, 638 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 
1981), IN RE U.S. EX REL. Missouri State High School, Etc. 
682 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1982), and Kent S. v. California 
Interscholastic Federation, 222 Ca.Rptr. 355 (Cal.App.2Dist. 
1986) . In each of these cases the information presented to 
the court was much the same. The results were also similar 
in that each time the athletic association was upheld in its 
right to make and enforce transfer regulations. 
222 Kentucky High School Athletic Association v. 
Jackson, 569 S.W.2d 185 (Ky. App. 1978) 
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children from ' one school to another in the middle of the 
year, the parents decided that the children would remain 
with their father and continue to attend school in the 
county school system. At the end of the school year, the 
children went to live with their mother. Both enrolled in 
the Williamsburg City School System in the fall of 1977. 
/ 
Kevin, because he had played basketball in the county the 
year before, was ruled ineligible to participate in the city 
system for a period of thirty-six school weeks. Kevin 
sought and was granted an injunction through the Whitley 
Circuit Court. The Kentucky High School Athletic 
Association appealed the decision to the court of appeals. 
The court of appeals held: 
[1] it was unfair and unreasonable for association to 
require that student's change of school have been 
simultaneous with custodial parent's change of 
residence in order to waive rule providing for 
ineligibility of student following school transfer; [2] 
absence of word "arbitrary" in complaint did not mean 
that complaint failed to alleged arbitrary action on 
part of association, and [3] judgment enjoining 
association from declaring student athlete ineligible 
did not constitute an unreasonable interference with 
the internal affairs of the association. (223) 
The appeal court had upheld the decision of the circuit 
court because the athletic association had not used good 
judgment in reviewing the case of Kevin Jackson. Students 
who had been moved from parent to parent by forces outside 
223 Ibid., at 186. 
their control have fared well with the courts. (224) In 
other action where a student moved with both parents, the 
court upheld the right of the student to move. (225) Yet 
another situation that led to the transfer regulation of an 
athletic association being overridden involved a student 
with a handicap. (226) In Doe v. Marshall, a student was 
moved by the courts because of an emotional handicap. In 
this case the student was allowed to participate.^ 
Another area of litigation that falls within the 
guidelines of transfers deals with nonresident students who 
want to participate in high school sports in the state where 
they are attending school. In September of 1981, the case 
of Menke v Ohio High School Athletic Association came 
before the courts of Ohio. (227) In 1979, the athletic 
association had amended its transfer rule to make 
nonresident students ineligible to participate in athletics 
throughout their attendance at any member school. One 
plaintiff was in the ninth grade and the other was in the 
eleventh. They, along with their parents, were residents of 
Kentucky and had been accepted to attend St. Xavier High 
224 See also, Laurenzo by Laurenzo v. Mississippi High 
School Activities Association, 662 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 
1981), 708 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1983) 
225 University Interscholastic League v. Jones, 715 
S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App. 1986) 
226 Doe v. Marshall, 459 F.Supp. 1190 (S.D. Tex. 1978) 
227 Menke v Ohio High School Athletic Association, 441 
N.E.2d 620 (Ohio App. 1981) 
School, a private Roman Catholic school in Ohio. Both 
students wanted to participate in athletics at the school 
but were forbidden by the regulation of the state athletic 
association. They sought a preliminary injunction through 
the trial court and were unsuccessful. They appealed to the 
court of appeals. The court of appeals found that 
nonresident students do not comprise a suspect class, 
further, the rule did not violate their right to due process 
nor did participation in athletics rise to the level of 
separate property or liberty interest. The court of appeals 
upheld the decision of the lower court and both students 
were ruled ineligible. In 1985, Dennis Alerding, a student 
at St. Xavier High School, again challenged the Ohio rule 
which prohibited nonresident students from participating in 
athletic competition for the school. (228) The court in 
Alerding followed the decision of the court in Menke and 
ruled that the rule was not violative of the student's 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. 
AGE LIMITATIONS 
A review of the athletic association handbooks reveals 
that all state associations have enacted rules that place 
age limits upon students for the purpose of athletic 
eligibility. To strengthen those rules, the associations 
228 Alerding v. Ohio High School Athletic Association, 
591 F.Supp. 1538 (S.D. Ohio 1985) 779 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 
1985) 
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have added limits on the number of years or semesters a 
student can retain his eligibility. In each case, the limit 
is four years or eight semesters to be counted from the time 
the student enters the ninth grade. Because of the 
closeness of purpose of the two rules, they have been 
treated as one in this section. 
Cases where students have been granted relief in regard 
to age limitations either by fact of age or the eight 
semester rule, are few in number and are from the same 
court. (229) In Lee v. Florida, the eight semester rule 
came under attack because of its lack of flexibility. (230) 
Dennis Lee had entered the ninth grade in September of 1969 
while he was living in California. In November of 1971, he 
and his family moved to Florida. At that time it became 
necessary for Dennis to stay out of school for a year and 
work to help support his family. He entered school at 
Hialeah Miami Lakes High School in September of 1972. He 
participated in sports during that year in Florida and came 
back for his senior year in 1973. At that point he was 
informed that he would be ineligible to participate in 
athletics because he had exceeded the eight semesters 
allowed for athletic competition. He brought action in the 
229 Lee v. Florida High School Activities Association 
Inc., 291 So.2d 636 (Fla. App. 1974), and Florida High 
School Activities Association Inc. v. Bryant, 313 So.2d 57 
(Fla. App. 1975). 
230 Lee v. Florida High School Activities Association 
Inc., 291 So.2d 636 (Fla. App. 1974) 
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Circuit Court of Dade County to enjoin the state athletic 
association from enforcing its eight semester rule. The 
circuit court dismissed the case and the plaintiff appealed. 
On appeal the court found that the Florida High School 
Activities Association had denied due process to the 
plaintiff because it had failed to give him the opportunity 
to present evidence of hardship, and that the rule was 
applied arbitrarily in this case. The decision of the lower 
court was reversed and the case was remanded with directions 
for the lower court. (231) The judges deciding the case 
were Barkdull, Hendry, and Haverfield. (232) In 1975, a 
case that was similar came before the court of appeals of 
Florida and the decision again was made in favor of the 
athlete. (233) In this case the judges were Barkdull, 
Hendry, and Carroll. (234) Both of these cases were decided 
on the basis of hardship of the student in question and are 
the only two that have overturned the age requirement or the 
eight semester rule. 
In 1977, a case dealing with the eight semester rule 
came before the courts of Georgia. (235) Leonard Smith 
231 Ibid. 
232 Ibid., at 637. 
233 Florida High School Activities Association Inc. v. 
Bryant, 313 So.2d 57 (Fla. App. 1975) 
234 Ibid., at 57. 
235 Smith v. Crim, 240 S.E.2d 884 (Sup. Ct. Ga. 1977) 
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entered Hoke Smith High School in the fall of 1973 as a 
ninth grader. In the spring of 1974, his mother became 
emotionally ill and he was forced to leave school in order 
to care for her. He reentered Hoke Smith High School in the 
fall of 1975 as a tenth grader and worked to make up the 
ninth grade work. He successfully completed grades ten and 
eleven and participated in football each year. At the 
beginning of his senior year, he was ruled ineligible to 
participate because of Georgia's eight semester rule. He 
contested the authority of the Georgia High School 
Association to enforce the eight semester rule. The 
Superior Court of Fulton County upheld the validity of the 
rule and Smith appealed. The Supreme Court of Georgia 
reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court decision. 
(236) Other cases have upheld the right of athletic 
associations to make and enforce eight semester rules. (237) 
In 1980, two companion cases came before the U.S. 
District Court in Texas. (238) In Blue v. University 
Interscholastic League, John Byrd and Phil Blue were members 
of the Greenville High School football team. Byrd had 
turned nineteen on his birthday in July and had participated 
236 Ibid. 
237 See also, DeKalb City School System v. White, 260 
S.E.2d 853 (Sup. Ga. 1979), and Burtt v. Nassau County 
Athletic Association, 421 N.Y.S.2d 172 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1979). 
238 Blue v. University Interscholastic League, 503 
F.Supp. 1030 (N.D. Tex. 1980) 
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on the Greenville team until it was discovered that he was 
ineligible under an athletic association rule that 
prohibited nineteen year old students from participating. 
During that time the Greenville team had played five games 
and Byrd had participated in each of them. Because of his 
participation the entire team was ordered to forfeit those 
games. Byrd sought to enjoin the athletic association from 
enforcing its age rule. Blue represented the entire 
Greenville team as a class and sought to enjoin the athletic 
association from allowing anyone other than the Greenville 
team from representing the league in the state playoffs. In 
presenting the decision of the court, Judge Sanders wrote: 
[1] the rule providing that students 19 years and older 
were ineligible to participate in league contest, and 
which established penalties for violation of the age 
eligibility requirement, did not violate due process 
and equal protection, and [2] since the rule did not 
violate due process and equal protection and it had not 
been demonstrated that the scheme of enforcement used 
by the governing body resulted in a deprivation of 
constitutional rights, and it was not established that 
plaintiffs would prevail on the merits, plaintiffs were 
not entitled to a preliminary injunction seeking to 
enjoin enforcement of the rule. (239) 
The court also found that the interests of Phil Blue and 
other members of the team to participate in the state 
playoffs amounted to mere expectation rather than a 
constitutionally protected claim of entitlement. (240) In 
both cases the application for preliminary injunction was 
239 Ibid., at 1031. 
240 Ibid., at 1034. 
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denied. The courts have been consistent in their support of 
the age limit regulations established by the state athletic 
associations. (241) Courts have also upheld the age 
requirement in a case where the student was handicapped. 
(242) Here, as in the other cases, the court recognized the 
danger of mature individuals participating with younger 
students. 
ACADEMIC ELIGIBILITY 
The first case to come to the courts which challenged 
the right of the state to set academic regulations for 
athletic participation originated in the state of West 
Virginia. (243) In 1984, two cases were consolidated and 
heard by the court of appeals of West Virginia. Both cases 
dealt with the validity of academic eligibility requirements 
for participation in nonacademic extracurricular activities. 
In the first case, the Wood County Board of Education 
petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the withdrawal 
of a rule of the State Board of Education requiring students 
to maintain a 2.0 or "C" average in order to participate in 
extracurricular activities. On August 12, 1983, the State 
241 See also, State Ex. Rel. Missouri State High School 
Athletic Association v. Schoenlaub, 507 S.W.2d 354 (Sup. Ct. 
Mo. 1974), Mahan v. Agee, 652 P.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. Okl. 1982), 
and Cavallaro by Cavallaro v. Ambach, 575 F.Supp. 171 
(W.D.N.Y. 1983). 
242 Cavallaro by Cavallaro v. Ambach, 575 F.Supp. 171 
(W.D.N.Y. 1983) 
243 Bailey v. Truby, 321 S.E.2d 302 (W.Va. 1984) 
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Board had adopted the new academic eligibility policy as 
part of a total educational program for the state. The rule 
was to take effect at the end of the first semester of the 
1983-84 school year. (244) On January 31, 1984, the Wood 
County Board of Education voted unanimously to refuse to 
implement the new regulation. On February 6, 1984, the 
board voted to seek a ruling from the court as to whether or 
not the State Board of Education had the right to pass such 
regulations. (245) In its petition, the Wood County Board 
of Education stated that it did not feel that the State 
Board of Education had the authority to make rules that 
governed the operations of extracurricular activities. It 
stated as its reason for this belief a section of the West 
Virginia Code, which in part states: 
The county boards of education are hereby granted and 
shall exercise the control, supervision and regulation 
of all interscholastic events, and other 
extracurricular activities of the students in public 
secondary schools, and of said schools of their 
respective counties. (246) 
It was upon this section of the West Virginia Codes that the 
court made the decision as to whether or not extracurricular 
activities were a part of the function of the State Board of 
Education. In its decision the court stated: 
We therefore hold that the state Board of Education's 
promulgation of a rule requiring students to maintain a 
244 Ibid., at 305. 
245 Ibid., at 306. 
246 Ibid., at 308. 
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2.0 grade point average in order to participate in 
nonacademic extracurricular activities is a legitimate 
exercise of its power of "general supervision" over the 
state's educational system. (247) 
In this portion of the case, the right of the State Board of 
Education to make and enforce rules pertaining to 
extracurricular activities was established. 
The second part of the case involved a student by the 
name of Rodney Myles. Rodney was a student at St. Albans 
High School and had participated as a member of the school 
basketball team. On October 24, 1983, the Kanawha County 
Board of Education adopted a new policy pertaining to 
academic requirements for athletic participation. (248) The 
policy of the local board was a copy of the state regulation 
with one exception, it added that a student, in addition to 
maintaining a 2.0 grade point average, must also pass all of 
the subjects being attempted. This addition to the state 
regulation was the cause of Rodney's becoming ineligible to 
participate in basketball that year. He had maintained a 
2.0 grade point average as required by the state but had 
failed English and was, therefore, ineligible by local 
standards. Rodney, through his mother, filed a petition for 
injunctive relief with the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. 
The relief was denied and he filed a petition with the court 
of appeals. In the petition he charged that the rule of the 
247 Ibid., at 313. 
248 Ibid., at 313. 
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Kanawha Board of Education constituted a denial of equal 
protection guaranteed to him under the fourteenth amendment, 
and that it violated his procedural and substantive due 
process rights. (249) After hearing the evidence and 
argument the court found: 
We therefore hold that the Kanawha County Board of 
Education's promulgation of a rule requiring students 
to receive passing grades in all of their classes, in 
addition to the State Board of Education's 2.0 grade 
point average rule, in order to participate in 
nonacademic extracurricular activities, is a legitimate 
exercise of its power of "control, supervision and 
regulation" of extracurricular activities; that it does 
not violate students' rights to procedural due process, 
substantive due process, and equal protection. (250) 
This case had set the stage with the decision that state 
organizations and boards could make and enforce academic 
regulations, and local boards could add to those regulations 
if they saw fit. 
In 1985 another case would challenge the right of a 
state to establish and enforce academic rules for athletic 
competition. (251) Chris Stamos, father of Nicky Stamos, 
brought suit seeking a permanent injunction against the 
enforcement of the Texas "no pass, no play" legislation. 
"No pass, no play" was a part of House Bill 72 which was an 
educational reform bill. The bill provided in part that a 
student was ineligible for participation in interscholastic 
249 Ibid. 
250 Ibid., at 319. 
251 Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556 
(Tex. 1985) 
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athletics if he or she failed to maintain at least a "70" 
average in every class. The district court of Harris County 
declared the legislation to be unconstitutional and issued 
an order enjoining its enforcement. The Attorney General 
appealed the decision. In reviewing the case, the supreme 
court found that the issue before the court was a single 
one, whether or not the "no pass, no play" rule was 
constitutional. (252) Stamos charged that the legislation 
violated his equal protection rights of the Texas 
Constitution, and that it violated his procedural and 
substantive due process rights. In considering the equal 
protection rights of the student, the court could not 
identify a suspect class that was created by the legislation 
and therefore dismissed the equal protection charge. (253) 
In considering the due process question, the court was in 
agreement with other courts in declaring that the right to 
participate in athletics failed to rise to the level of a 
right that would be guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Therefore the due process claims were dismissed and the 
decision of the lower court was reversed and the temporary 
injunction was dissolved. 
The courts in two different states had agreed on two 
similar cases. The states had established in court that 
they had the right to make and enforce academic regulations 
252 Ibid., at 558. 
253 Ibid., at 559. 
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pertaining to athletic competition. Local boards of 
education had also established the right to add to state 
minimum requirements pertaining to eligibility regulations. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Athletic eligibility is an area of major importance in 
our schools today. Its importance has come about as a 
result of pressure brought by the local community to perform 
well and to "win". If an athlete is talented enough and 
willing to work perfecting his skills, he may be able to pay 
his college costs by participating in sports. An even 
smaller percentage of these athletes will be able to advance 
to professional leagues and earn large sums of money as 
professionals. For the sake of this small percentage, it is 
extremely important that all of the facts be collected and 
the administrator responsible for making the decisions 
involving athletic eligibility be well informed about the 
legal ramifications of his decision. A wrong or unwise 
decision might deprive a student of a bright future and the 
opportunity to earn considerable money. Eligibility 
regulations have been placed on athletes by state and local 
boards of education, state legislatures, state athletic 
associations and in some instances by local school 
administrators. Oftentimes students turn to the court 
system to determine the legality of eligibility requirements 
and their application to them. 
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This study dealt with determining the legality of 
athletic eligibility restrictions at the secondary school 
level. It was necessary to review the athletic eligibility 
requirements of each of the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia in order to establish what the rules were 
pertaining to athletic eligibility nationwide. Based on a 
review of the court cases from 1972 until 1988, the list of 
eligibility rules was narrowed into five separate and 
specific areas: gender-based discrimination, discrimination 
against the handicapped, transfer regulations, age 
limitations for participation, and academic eligibility. 
These five areas represent the predominant body of 
litigation pertaining to athletic eligibility for secondary 
schools. Pieces of legislation at the state and national 
level were reviewed to reveal their influence on state 
athletic associations and the making of their rules. The 
research also included a review and reporting of state and 
federal court cases pertaining to the five stated areas of 
athletic eligibility. These cases were reported by area and 
in chronological order. Cases were also grouped according 
to outcome to aid in the understanding of the results. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATION 
For clarity of presentation, the area of gender-based 
discrimination was divided into two main categories, 
106 
challenges to athletic association rules which are brought 
on behalf of individuals, and challenges to regulations that 
charge unequal treatment of teams. In dealing with 
challenges brought by individuals, there are three specific 
areas of case law. The first deals with females who have 
petitioned the courts charging discrimination. Of the 
twelve cases to come before the courts treating this issue, 
all twelve have been decided in favor of the female athlete. 
Each of these cases dealt with the rights of the female to 
equal treatment guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The 
second is the area of litigation dealing with alleged 
violations of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. 
Of the four cases to come before the courts treating this 
issue, two have upheld the athletic association or school, 
and two have found in favor of the student. In the two 
cases where students won, the case was decided on the basis 
of the fourteenth amendment, not on the basis of the Title 
IX claim. However, with the override of President Reagan's 
veto on the Civil Rights Restoration Act, dated March 22, 
1988, this trend in the courts is over. This legislation 
defined "program" as having an institutional approach, thus 
making all athletic programs answerable to Title IX 
legislation if any part of the school or school system 
receives any federal assistance. The third area of 
litigation involving individuals deals with males seeking 
the right to participate on female teams. Of the four cases 
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to come before the courts treating this issue, one has found 
in favor of the student and three have upheld the rules of 
the athletic associations. 
In court cases where the focus was on the team and 
charges of unequal treatment of female teams, litigants have 
been less successful. Of the four court cases to come 
before the courts treating this issue, three have upheld the 
rules of the athletic association. The combination of all 
court cases dealing with gender-based discrimination reveals 
that of the twenty cases treating this matter, fifteen have 
been decided in favor of the student. The Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1988 has provisions contrary to the 
decision reached in two of the cases lost. 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE HANDICAPPED 
According to federal regulations, there are two 
distinct classifications for handicapped students, 
physically handicapped students and mentally or emotionally 
handicapped students. The two major pieces of federal 
regulations dealing with handicapped students are The 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, better known as PL 94-142. 
Cases dealing with physically handicapped students are 
limited in number and varied in response. Of the six court 
cases to come before the courts treating this issue, 
students have won four of the cases and lost only two. 
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Since students began bringing court actions charging 
handicapped discrimination based on section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, student athletes have not lost 
in court. When dealing with the mentally or emotionally 
handicapped student, the courts are divided. Of the two 
court cases treating this issue, the students have won one 
case and lost one case; therefore no precedent has been set 
by the courts. The combination of all court cases dealing 
with handicapped students reveals that of the eight court 
cases treating the subject of handicapped students, five 
have been decided in favor of the student. 
TRANSFER REGULATIONS 
One of the most often contested areas of athletic 
eligibility is that of transfer regulations. A review of 
court cases dealing with transfer regulations reveals that 
the topic can be divided into four specific subtopics: 
penalties to schools, students' right to travel, 
nonresidents seeking opportunity to participate, and 
students seeking constitutional protection. 
The first area of transfer regulations deals with the 
right of athletic associations to penalize schools for 
violations of transfer regulations. In the only court case 
treating this subject, the athletic association was upheld 
in its decision to declare a team ineligible because of its 
violation of the transfer regulation. The second area of 
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litigation dealt with students charging that transfer 
regulations violated their right to free travel guaranteed 
by the constitution. Of the two court cases dealing with 
this matter, the courts upheld the student in both cases. 
However, the reason for upholding the student was different 
in each case and only one of the two courts held that 
transfer regulations were in violation of the student's 
right to travel. The third area of litigation, dealing 
with transfer regulations, dealt with nonresident students 
seeking the opportunity to participate in a state where they 
were not residents. Of the two court cases treating this 
matter, the courts upheld the right of the athletic 
association to declare nonresident students ineligible for 
athletic participation for their entire high school career. 
The fourth area of litigation dealing with transfer 
regulations dealt with students seeking constitutional 
protection from athletic association transfer rules. Of the 
eighteen court cases treating this matter, fourteen have 
found in favor of the athletic associations right to make 
and enforce transfer regulations. Of the four cases that 
found in favor of students, each involved an extenuating 
circumstance which led to the reverse decision. The 
combination of all court cases dealing with transfer 
regulations reveals that of the twenty-three court cases 
treating this matter, seventeen were decided in favor of the 
athletic associations' rules. 
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AGE LIMITATIONS 
A review of state athletic association regulations 
reveals that age regulations can be divided into two 
distinct areas: student age limitations and eight semester 
rules. Eight semester rules limit the amount of time a 
student is eligible to participate after he has entered the 
ninth grade. Of the five court cases treating this matter, 
three have found in favor of the state athletic 
associations' rules. The two cases that found in favor of 
the student were from the same court and decided by the same 
judge. Each state athletic association has set a maximum 
limit for student age when seeking athletic eligibility. 
These rules have also been challenged. Of the three court 
cases treating this matter, all have found in favor of the 
athletic associations rule's. The age limitation was also 
upheld when dealing with one handicapped student. The 
combination of all court cases dealing with age limitations 
reveals that of the nine court cases treating this matter, 
six were decided in favor of the athletic associations' 
rules. 
ACADEMIC ELIGIBILITY 
In increasing numbers, athletic associations are adding 
academic regulations to their rules for eligibility. These 
regulations have been added by state boards of education, 
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state legislatures, state athletic associations, and local 
boards of education. In each instance, minimum requirements 
are set for athletic participation. There are some states, 
however, which do not place academic requirements on 
students for athletic participation. Of the three cases 
treating this matter, all have been decided in favor of the 
state organization which made the rule. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Athletic eligibility is an area of great importance in 
school systems across the United States. Each year much 
time is spent by coaches and administrators trying to 
determine which students will be eligible to participate and 
which will not. Students seeking the opportunity to 
participate must be measured according to the guidelines 
established by their state athletic association and by any 
additional rules set forth by the local school or school 
board. When a student is deemed to be in violation of any 
of these regulations, he is considered ineligible to 
participate. Any and all ineligible students have the right 
to appeal the decision of the local school and be heard by 
the state association. When the problem cannot be solved at 
that level, the student will often involve the courts to 
determine the legality of eligibility regulations. 
Based upon the research contained in this project, the 
following conclusions can be drawn: 
112 
[1] The courts have upheld the rights of the female 
athlete when the charge of discrimination is based upon 
violations of the fourteenth amendment. 
[2] Females do not have a right to participate; 
however, they do have the right to equal treatment. 
Whatever is provided for males using educational money must 
be open to females as well. 
[3] The courts have established three acceptable 
options for dealing with female athletes seeking to 
participate on an established all-male team. First, the 
school can drop the sport for males, second, the school can 
offer separate but equal teams for females, or third, the 
school can allow the female to compete with the males for a 
position on the previously all-male team. 
[4] Courts have upheld different treatment for female 
teams when the difference has been based upon a specific 
purpose and when such treatment helps to accomplish that 
purpose. 
[5] Courts have been reluctant to deal with female 
discrimination charges based on Title IX violations, but 
have dealt with whether or not secondary school athletic 
programs were subject to Title IX legislation. Early 
losses by females charging discrimination under Title IX 
cannot continue. Based on the language of the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1988, all areas of a school receiving 
federal aid will be subject to Title IX legislation. No 
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more will cases be dismissed because they fail to fall under 
the jurisdiction of Title IX. 
[6] Handicapped students have been successful in court 
when the basis of the charge is the violation of section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and they can prove that 
they are otherwise eligible. 
[7] When dealing with handicapped students, the courts 
have begun to look at the right of the parents and the 
student to make decisions and have moved away from the 
enforcement of the AMA recommendations. Schools have an 
obligation to inform the student and parents of possible 
dangers and then let the parents and child make the 
decision. If the decision of the parent and child is to 
participate in athletics, then the school should not stand 
in the way. 
[8] Teams which allow ineligible students to 
participate have been penalized and forced to forfeit the 
games in which the ineligible student participated. These 
forfeitures of wins have been upheld by the courts. 
[9] Transfer rules have been upheld by the courts when 
they were constructed to fulfill the purpose for which they 
were written, and when they were applied in a fair, 
equitable manner. They have been overturned only when it 
has been proven that they were applied in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner. 
[10] The eight semester rule has, in most cases, been 
upheld by the courts. In those situations where the rule 
was not upheld, there have been extenuating circumstances 
that placed a burden of hardship on the student. 
[11] The age limits set by each athletic association 
have always been upheld by the courts. The courts have 
recognized the danger of having adults participate against 
younger and less mature students. 
[12] Athletic associations, state boards of education, 
state legislatures, and local boards of education have the 
right to establish academic regulations for athletic 
participation. These rules do not create a suspect class 
and do not deny to the student any right guaranteed under 
state or federal law. However, based on the limited number 
of court cases treating this matter, conclusions cannot be 
stated in an absolute manner. 
[13] A student's claim to participate in athletics 
does not rise to the level of a property right and is, 
therefore, not protected by the Constitution of the United 
States or any state constitution. Furthermore, since there 
is no right to participate, there can be no claim to due 
process. Therefore, the student's only right is to fair and 
equitable treatment. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
Dreams of being the sports hero in high school, 
college, and even in the professional leagues occupy a large 
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part of many young children's early fantasies. For those 
students who have the potential to make their dreams a 
reality, the area of athletic eligibility will become a 
major interest in their early lives. In order to deal 
fairly and consistently with these students, the school 
administrator must be familiar with the rules of eligibility 
that his school is governed by and also with the legality of 
each of these regulations. Most eligibility cases that are 
taken to court involve some type of extenuating circumstance 
which makes that case just a little different from the rest 
of the cases. Therefore, each case must be treated 
separately and must allow the student to present any and all 
information that might justify his hardship claim. The 
information presented in this study can be of help to the 
school administrator by providing for him a history of each 
of the five areas of student eligibility covered herein. It 
also provides him with court cases that have been decided 
which will reflect the position of the courts when hearing 
suits against local schools and state athletic associations. 
It is hoped that this information will be utilized in a 
positive way which will help not only administrators but, 
most importantly, student athletes as well. When cases go 
to court, oftentimes they are decided too late to be of 
benefit to the student even when he has won. Research from 
this project, it is hoped, will allow persons in authority 
to make right and fair decisions before the matter gets to 
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the courts, thus avoiding the lengthy, costly process of 
going through the legal system. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Athletics have become an important part of most 
secondary schools across the United States. This increased 
level of attention and importance has led to an intensified 
look at athletic eligibility. It is likely that court 
action will continue and that athletic associations will 
continue to modify their rules to maintain conformity with 
state and federal court decisions. Therefore, these 
recommendations are made for further study: 
[1] It is recommended that a study be conducted to 
examine the effect of civil rights legislation on athletic 
eligibility regulations. Civil rights legislation should be 
defined as any legislation aimed at protecting groups of 
people from discrimination, whether it be handicapped, 
female, race, or minorities. 
[2] It is recommended that a study be conducted to 
examine the legality of the separate but equal doctrine that 
has been applied to female athletic eligibility regulations 
in some state and federal courts. 
[3] It is recommended that a study be conducted 
comparing states with strict eligibility requirements with 
states that have minimal requirements. Included in this 
study would be a look at the philosophies behind the 
decision of each athletic association. 
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APPENDIX A 
GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATION 
STATE ATHLETIC ASSOICITION POSITIONS 
I. States with disclaimers, example: ...no person, on the 
basis of sex, shall be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity offered by 
the association. 
Alabama Alaska Dist. of Columbia 
Maine Maryland Massachusetts 
II. States which give the states three choices; 1. Not 
allow sports teams for boys or girls. 2. Provide 
seperate and equal teams for boys and girls. 3. Allow 
girls to participate on boys teams. 
Colorado Conneticut Georgia 
Hawaii Idaho Indiana 
Kansas Kentucky Nevada 
North Carolina North Dakota South Carolina 
Wyoming 
III. States which allow female participation on male teams 
even when a female team is provided in a particular 
sport. 
California New York 
IV. States which provide female programs but do not allow 
female participation on male teams in contact or 
collision sports. 
Rhode Island Utah 
V. States which do not have a stated policy pertaining to 
female participation, but have taken female prohabition 
out of theie rules. 
Arizona 
Florida 
Louisiana 
Mississippi 
Nebraska 
New Mexico 
Arkansas 
Illinois 
Michigan 
Missouri 
New Hampshire 
Ohio 
Delaware 
Iowa 
Minnesota 
Montana 
New Jersey 
Oklahoma 
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Oregon 
Tennessee 
Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Pennsylvania 
Texas 
Washington 
South 
Vermont 
West 
Dakota 
Virginia 
This information is based on a review of the handbooks of 
the fifty state athletic associations and the District of 
Columbia as of February 1988. 
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APPENDIX B 
AGE LIMIIT REQUIREMENTS BY STATE 
I. States with maximum age limit of eighteen years and six 
months. 
Hawaii 
II. States with maximum age limit of nineteen years. 
Alabama 
California 
Delaware 
Georgia 
Indiana 
Louisiana 
Michigan 
Montana 
New Jersey 
North Carolina 
Oregon 
South Carolina 
Utah 
Wisconsin 
Ar izona 
Colorado 
Dist. of Col. 
Idaho 
Kansas 
Maryland 
Mississippi 
Nebraska 
New Mexico 
Ohio 
Pennsylvania 
Tennessee 
Virginia 
Arkansas 
Connecticut 
Florida 
Illinois 
Kentucky 
Massachusetts 
Missouri 
Nevada 
New York 
Oklahoma 
Rhode Island 
Texas 
West Virginia 
III. States with maximum age limit of twenty years. 
Alaska 
Minnesota 
South Dakota 
Wyoming 
Iowa 
New Hampshire 
Vermont 
Maine 
North Dakota 
Washington 
The National Federation of State High School Associations 
recommends that the maximum age limit for athletic 
participation be set at nineteen years. 
The information contained in this chart is based upon a 
review of the handbooks of the fifty state athletic 
associations and the District of Columbia. Also the 
recommendation of the National Fedration came from the 
National Handbook. Data are as of February 1988. 
APPENDIX C 
STATES WITH AN EIGHT SEMESTER RULE 
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State athletic associations have found it necessary to 
have an eight semester rule that governs athletic 
participation. The eight semester rule gives students eight 
semesters to complete their four years of high school 
eligibility. The eight semesters begins when a student 
enrolls in the ninth grade. 
States which have enacted an eight semester rule 
pertaining to athletic participation. 
Alabama 
Arkansas 
Connecticut 
Florida 
Idaho 
Iowa 
Louisiana 
Massachusetts 
Mississippi 
Nebraska 
New Jersey 
North Carolina 
Oklahoma 
Rhode Island 
Tennessee 
Vermont 
West Virginia 
Alaska 
California 
Delaware 
Georgia 
Illinois 
Kansas 
Maine 
Michigan 
Missour i 
Nevada 
New Mexico 
North Dakota 
Oregon 
South Carolina 
Texas 
Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Arizona 
Colorado 
Dist. of Col. 
Hawaii 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Maryland 
Minnesota 
Montana 
New Hampshire 
New York 
Ohio 
Pennsylvania 
South Dakota 
Utah 
Washington 
Wyoming 
The National Federation of State High School Associations 
recomends that each state adopt an eight semester rule. 
The information contained in this chart is based upon a 
review of the handbooks of the fifty state athletic 
associations and the District of Columbia as is current as 
of February 1988. 
ACADEMIC 
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APPENDIX D 
REQUIREMENTS FOR ATHLETIC PARTICIPATION 
I. States which do not establish a minimum academic 
requirement. 
Maryland Hawaii * New York 
Vermont Maine ** 
* Hawaii leaves the setting of minimum academic standards to 
each conference or district. 
** Maine leaves the setting of minimum academic standards up 
to each school. 
II. States which require an athlete to pass a minimum of 
two units of credit in order to be eligible to 
participate. 
Missouri Nevada * 
* Nevada has a two course requirement except during the 
athletic season in which the student is participating. 
During this period of time a student cannot fail any of his 
or her subjects and remain eligible. 
III. States which require an athlete to pass a minimum of 
three units of credit in order to be eligible to 
participate. 
Arkansas Iowa Mississippi 
Nebraska North Dakota Rhode Island 
IV. States which require an athlete to pass a minimum of 
four units of credit in order to be eligible to 
participate. 
Alabama 
Connecticut 
Illinois 
Massachusetts 
New Hampshire 
Ohio 
Pennsylvania 
Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Alaska 
Delaware 
Indiana 
Michigan 
New Mexico * 
Oklahoma 
South Carolina 
Washington 
Wyoming 
Colorado 
Dist. of Col. 
Kentucky 
Montana 
North Carolina 
Oregon 
South Dakota 
West Virginia** 
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*New Mexico requires students to pass at least four units of 
credit, but not fail more that one course and to maintain at 
least a 2.0 GPA. 
**In addition to passing four units of credit the state of 
West Virginia also requires that students maintain a 2.0 
GPA. 
V. States which require an athlete to pass a minimum of 
four units of credit in order to be eligible to 
participate. 
Arizona 
Idaho 
Tennessee 
Florida 
Kansas 
** 
Georgia 
Louiusiana * 
•Louisiana requires that students pass five units of credit 
plus maintain a 1.5 GPA. 
**In 1988 North Carolina will require five units. 
VI. States with special requirements for academic 
achievement. 
California students must pass at least four units as 
set by the state athletic association and in addition 
meet the minimum GPA requirements set by each local 
unit. 
Minnesota students, according to the state 
requirements, must be making satisfactory progress 
toward graduation. 
New Jersey students cannot fail more that two units of 
credit and must maintain at least a 2.0 GPA. 
Utah students cannot fail more than one unit of credit. 
Texas students must pass every course they are 
attempting in order to maintain their eligibility. "No 
pass, no play" 
The National Federation of State High School Associations 
recomends that states set a limit of four units passed in 
order to maintain athletic eligibility. 
The information contained in this chart is based upon a 
review of the handbooks of the fifty state athletic 
associations and the District of Columbia. 
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APPENDIX E 
STATE TRANSFER RULES 
I. All states have rules that allow a transfer student to 
be elligible immediatly if the students move coincides 
with the move of the parents or the parent that has 
custody. This is known as a bonafide transfer and no 
penalty is placed upon the student. 
II. States which require a waiting period of one semester 
before a student is eligible when the transfer is ruled 
to be other than bonafide. 
Alaska 
Florida 
Michigan 
Nebraska 
Virginia 
Colorado 
Iowa 
Minnesota 
New Mexico 
Wyoming 
Delaware 
Kansas 
Montana 
North Dakota 
III. States which require a waiting period of one year 
before a student is eligible when the transfer is ruled 
to be other than bonafide. 
Alabama 
California 
Georgia 
Indiana 
Maine 
Mississippi 
New Hampshire 
Oklahoma 
South Carolina 
Texas 
Washington 
Arizona 
Connecticut 
Idaho 
Kentucky 
Maryland 
Missouri 
North Carolina 
Oregon 
South Dakota 
Utah 
Wisconsin 
Arkansas 
Dist. of Col. 
Illinois 
Louisiana 
Massechusetts 
Nevada 
Ohio 
Pennsylvania 
Tennessee 
Vermont 
IV. States which have unusual transfer requirements. 
Transfers in the state of New York are required to sit 
out a total of fourteen days before they gain 
eligibility to participate when the transfer is 
considered to be other than bonafide. 
Transfers in Rhode island are considered ineligible for 
a period of twenty weeks when the transfer is 
considered to be other than bonafide. 
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Transfers in West Virginia are considered ineligible 
for a period of one-hundred and twenty days when the 
transfer is considered to be other than bonafide. 
Transfer students in New Jersey are considered 
ineligible for a period of thirty days when the 
transfer is considered to be other than bonafide. 
Hawaii does not have a transfer rule in it's handbook. 
This information is based on a review of the handbooks of 
the fifty state athletic associations and the District of 
Columbia as of February 1988. 
